# SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF BRONX

In the Matter of a Proceeding under Article 70 of the CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order to Show Cause,

THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on behalf of HAPPY,

Petitioner,

-against-

JAMES J. BREHENY, in his official capacity as the Executive Vice President and General Director of Zoos and Aquariums of the Wildlife Conservation Society and Director of the Bronx Zoo, and WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY,

Index No.: 260441/2019 (Bronx County)

NOTICE OF MOTION TO STRIKE RESPONDENTS' VERIFIED ANSWER

## Respondents.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that upon the annexed affirmation of Elizabeth Stein, Esq., an attorney of record for Petitioner, the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc., dated August 2, 2019, and all exhibits attached thereto, the Memorandum of Law dated August 2, 2019 in support of this Notice of Motion to Strike Respondents' Verified Answer, and all prior pleadings, memoranda, demands, attachments filed this affidavits. exhibits. and in matter. Petitioner will make a motion at the Civil Term, Bronx County Supreme Court to be held at the courthouse thereof (Room 217), located at 851 Grand Concourse, Bronx, NY 10451, on the 12th day of August, 2019, at 9:30 o'clock in the forenoon of that day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, for an order striking Respondents' Verified Answer, on the grounds that it: (1) is untimely under the November 16, 2018 Order to Show Cause issued by the Supreme Court, Orleans County and therefore under CPLR 7008(a), and (2) was filed without court permission as required by CPLR 404(a). Petitioner further requests such other and further relief that the Court may deem just, proper, and equitable.

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that, under the Part 5 Court Rules for Justice Alison Y. Tuitt, oral argument is required on this non-disclosure motion, and the motion procedure rules of this Court provide that the "motion shall be adjourned for oral argument before the I.A. Judge on the second Monday following the week of the return date of the motion" (August 26, 2019).

Dated: August 2, 2019

Elizabeth Stein, Esq. Attorney for Petitioner 5 Dunhill Road

New Hyde Park, New York 11040

516-747-4726

lizsteinlaw@gmail.com

### NOTICE TO:

Civil Branch Clerk's Office Bronx County Supreme Court, Room 217 851 Grand Concourse Bronx, NY 10451 By Overnight Mail

#### PHILLIPS LYTLE LLP

Kenneth A. Manning, Esq.

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# SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF BRONX

In the Matter of a Proceeding under Article 70 of the CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order to Show Cause,

THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on behalf of HAPPY,

Petitioner.

-against-

JAMES J. BREHENY, in his official capacity as the Executive Vice President and General Director of Zoos and Aquariums of the Wildlife Conservation Society and Director of the Bronx Zoo, and WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY,

Respondents.

Index No.: 260441/2019

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION TO STRIKE RESPONDENTS' VERIFIED ANSWER

Elizabeth Stein, Esq. 5 Dunhill Road New Hyde Park, NY 11040 Email: lizsteinlaw@gmail.com Phone: (516) 747-4726

Steven M. Wise, Esq.
Of the Bar of the State of Massachusetts
Appearing pro hac vice<sup>1</sup>
5195 NW 112th Terrace
Coral Springs, FL 33076
Email: swise@nonhumanrights.org
Phone: (954) 648-9864

Attorneys for Petitioner

August 2, 2019

On October 2, 2018, Petitioner made a motion to admit Steven M. Wise, Esq. pro hac vice to brief and argue the above-captioned action. Justice Tracey A. Bannister subsequently permitted Attorney Wise to argue in all three hearings before the Supreme Court, Orleans County.

### I. Introduction and procedural history

On October 2, 2018, Petitioner, the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ("NhRP"), filed a Verified Petition for a Common Law Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order to Show Cause ("Petition") in the Supreme Court, Orleans County ("Orleans Court") on behalf of an Asian elephant named Happy, alleging that she is being unlawfully imprisoned at the Bronx Zoo by Respondents James J. Breheny and the Wildlife Conservation Society (collectively "Bronx Zoo" or "Respondents"). On November 16, 2018, the Orleans Court issued an Order to Show Cause<sup>2</sup> (attached as "Exhibit 1" to the annexed Affirmation of Elizabeth Stein) and made it returnable on December 14, 2018, when a hearing was held in Albion.<sup>3</sup>

On December 3, 2018, the Bronx Zoo filed a Notice of Motion (attached as "Exhibit 3" to the annexed Affirmation of Elizabeth Stein) that requested the Orleans Court to (1) transfer this proceeding to the Supreme Court, Bronx County; or "in the alternative," to (2) dismiss the Petition pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) "for failure to state a cause of action on which relief can be granted, for lack of standing, and pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel" or, in the event the Orleans Court did not dismiss the Petition, to allow "Respondents five days to answer to the Verified Petition pursuant to CPLR 404(a)." Exh. 3 (emphasis added).

On January 18, 2019, the Orleans Court granted Respondents' motion to transfer venue to Bronx County over the NhRP's objections. On April 8, 2019, the New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department denied the NhRP's request for leave to appeal the transfer order.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The only difference between a writ of habeas corpus and an order to show cause under Article 70 is that the "former requires production of the prisoner for the hearing on the writ, whereas the latter dispenses with such presence." Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's CPLR 7001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> During that hearing the Orleans Court heard arguments on the merits of the NhRP's Petition from both parties—most significantly on whether Happy is a legal person entitled to habeas corpus relief. See Transcript of Dec. 14, 2018 Hearing (attached as "Exhibit 2" to the annexed Affirmation of Elizabeth Stein).

On July 8, 2019, the Bronx Zoo filed its Verified Answer ("Answer") in the Supreme Court, Bronx County and served it upon the NhRP on July 10, 2019 (attached as "Exhibit 4" to the annexed Affirmation of Elizabeth Stein). The NhRP submits this Memorandum of Law in support of its Notice of Motion to Strike Respondents' Verified Answer ("Motion to Strike").

II. The Bronx Zoo's Answer should be stricken as it was filed over seven months after the court-ordered deadline and without required court permission.

This Court should grant the NhRP's Motion to Strike for two reasons.

First, the Bronx Zoo's Answer was filed over seven months after the court-ordered deadline.

A return<sup>5</sup> to a habeas corpus petition must be "filed at the time and place specified in the writ."

CPLR 7008(a). The Order to Show Cause specified that any "answering affidavits" must be received by Elizabeth Stein, Esq., the counsel of record for the NhRP, no later than December 3, 2018, and set the return date for December 14, 2018. See Exh. 1

The Bronx Zoo neither served nor filed a return to the Petition by either the December 3, 2018 deadline or the December 14, 2018 hearing. Instead, as noted above, the Bronx Zoo filed its Notice of Motion.

Accordingly, as the Bronx Zoo did not serve or file a return to the Petition by the December 3, 2018 deadline prescribed by the Order to Show Cause as required under CPLR 7008(a), or even by the December 14, 2018 hearing on the merits of the Petition, the Bronx Zoo's Answer must be stricken as untimely.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The NhRP incorporates by reference all the arguments, evidence, exhibits, memoranda, testimony, transcripts, and authorities previously filed in this case, including all prior proceedings in Orleans County.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In a habeas corpus proceeding, the "return" is "an affidavit that answers the allegations of the petition." Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's CPLR 7008. CPLR 7008(b) provides the substantive requirements of the return, requiring that: "[t]he affidavit shall fully and explicitly state whether the person detained is or has been in the custody of the person to whom the writ is directed, the authority and cause of the detention, whether custody has been transferred to another, and the facts of and authority for any such transfer." CPLR 7008(b).

Second, the Bronx Zoo's July 8, 2019 Answer was filed without required court permission.

In its Notice of Motion, the Bronx Zoo explicitly recognized the need for court permission to file a return under CPLR 404(a) when it requested five days to do so in the event the Petition was not dismissed. See Exh. 3

CPLR 404(a) provides that "[t]he respondent may raise an objection in point of law by setting it forth in his answer or by a motion to dismiss the petition," and that "[i]f the motion is denied, the court may permit the respondent to answer, upon such terms as may be just." (Emphasis added). Thus, when a respondent raises an objection in point of law in a pre-answer motion to dismiss, court permission to answer the petition is required. See Matter of Foley, 140 A.D.2d 892, 893 (3d Dept. 1988) ("The right to submit an answer following denial of a motion to dismiss in a special proceeding is discretionary") (citing CPLR 404(a)); Targee Street Internal Medicine Group PC Profit Sharing Trust v. Nationwide Assoc, 300 A.D.2d 497, 498 (2d Dept. 2002).

Significantly, as the Bronx Zoo's motion to dismiss and motion to answer were made "in the alternative" to transferring this case to Bronx County, they are no longer pending since the Orleans Court granted the Bronx Zoo's request to transfer venue. But pending or not, the Orleans Court did not grant the Bronx Zoo permission to answer the Petition.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> An "objection in point of law" to a petition "is treated as similar to a CPLR 3211 motion to dismiss in an action." Orange County Publications Division of Ottaway Newspapers-Radio Inc v. White, 55 Misc.2d 42, 44 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Langella v. Front Door Associates Inc, 34 Misc.3d 1212(A) (Sup. Ct. 2012) (objections in point of law "should be limited to the assertion of one or more of defenses in bar of the type contemplated by CPLR 3211(a)") (citations omitted).

Accordingly, as neither the Orleans Court nor this Court ruled on the Bronx Zoo's motion to dismiss<sup>7</sup> or granted the Bronx Zoo permission to answer the Petition,<sup>8</sup> the Bronx Zoo's Answer should be stricken.

#### III. Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the Bronx Zoo's Answer should be stricken because it was filed over seven months after the court-ordered deadline and without required court permission.

Accordingly, this Court should grant the NhRP's Motion to Strike, together with such other and further relief that the Court may deem just, proper, and equitable.

Dated: August 2, 2019

Elizabeth Stein, Esq. Attorney for Petitioner

5 Dunhill Road

New Hyde Park, New York 11040

(516) 747-4726

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Steven M. Wise, Esq. Attorney for Petitioner

Of the Bar of the State of Massachusetts

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Assuming, arguendo, that the Bronx Zoo's motion to dismiss is still pending, this Court should deny it for the reasons stated in the NhRP's Reply Memorandum of Law (dated December 10, 2018). at 13 – 20.

Sesuming, arguendo, that the Bronx Zoo's motion to answer the Petition is still pending, this Court should not now permit the Bronx Zoo to file an answer for the reasons stated in the NhRP's Reply Memorandum of Law (dated December 10, 2018), at 5 – 7. The Bronx Zoo had previously filed affidavits and memoranda of law, including those in support of its motion to dismiss, that adequately fulfilled the substantive requirements of CPLR 7008(b), and therefore filing an answer at this juncture would serve no useful purpose—except cause further unnecessary delay in the proceedings. See Matter of Dodge, 25 N.Y.2d 273, 286-287 (1969) ("Special Term properly determined that 'no useful purpose can be served by any answer interposed...") (emphasis added); see also People ex rel Gittens v. Coughlin, 143 Misc.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. 1989) ("Preliminarily, the court deems respondents' submissions in this proceeding to constitute a return, in accordance with CPLR 7008. The writ of habeas corpus is meant to be an expeditious summary proceeding that tolerates no delay except of necessity... The court must summarily dispose of the proceeding as justice requires") (citations omitted). Moreover, even without a formal return, the Orleans Court held a hearing on December 14, 2018 at which both parties argued the merits of the Petition, thus further evidencing its unnecessity. See People ex rel Pray v. Allen, 63 A.D.2d 1056 (3d Dept. 1978), 143 Misc.2d 748 (3d Dept. 1978) ("absence of a formal return was an irregularity and not a defect" as "the requirements of CPLR 7008 (subd [b]) were met at the outset of the appearance on behalf of the respondent on the return date").

Appearing pro hac vice 5195 NW 112<sup>th</sup> Terrace Coral Springs, Florida 33076 954-648-9864 swise@nonlnunanrights.org

# SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF BRONX

In the Matter of a Proceeding under Article 70 of the CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order to Show Cause,

THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on behalf of HAPPY,

Index No.: 260441/2019 (Bronx County)

Petitioner.

-against-

ATTORNEY AFFIRMATION OF ELIZABETH STEIN

JAMES J. BREHENY, in his official capacity as the Executive Vice President and General Director of Zoos and Aquariums of the Wildlife Conservation Society and Director of the Bronx Zoo, and WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY,

## Respondents.

I, ELIZABETH STEIN, an attorney duly admitted to practice law in the State of New York, hereby affirm the following under penalty of perjury:

- I am an attorney of record for Petitioner, the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ("NhRP"), in the above-captioned matter and am not a party in this action.
- I am fully familiar with the pleadings and proceedings in this matter, have read and know the
  contents thereof, and submit this affirmation in support of the within Notice of Motion to Strike
  Respondents' Verified Answer ("Motion to Strike").

#### BACKGROUND

3. On October 2, 2018, the NhRP filed a Verified Petition for a Common Law Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order to Show Cause ("Petition") pursuant to CPLR Article 70 on behalf of an Asian elephant named Happy, alleging that she is being unlawfully imprisoned at the Bronx

- Zoo by Respondents James J. Breheny and the Wildlife Conservation Society (collectively "Bronx Zoo" or "Respondents").
- 4. On November 16, 2018, the Supreme Court, Orleans County ("Orleans Court") issued an Order to Show Cause (attached hereto as Exhibit 1) and made it returnable on December 14, 2018, when a hearing was held in Albion. (Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is the transcript of the December 14, 2018 hearing).
- The Order to Show Cause specified, among other things, that any answering affidavits must be received by Elizabeth Stein, Esq. no later than December 3, 2018.
- 6. On December 3, 2018, in lieu of serving or filing a return in accordance with CPLR 7008, the Bronx Zoo filed a Notice of Motion that requested the Orleans Court to (1) transfer this proceeding to the Supreme Court, Bronx County; or "in the alternative," to (2) dismiss the Petition pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) "for failure to state a cause of action on which relief can be granted, for lack of standing, and pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel" or, in the event the Orleans Court did not dismiss the Petition, to allow "Respondents five days to answer to the Verified Petition pursuant to CPLR 404(a)." (Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is the Bronx Zoo's Notice of Motion) (emphasis added).
- During the December 14, 2018 hearing, the Orleans Court heard arguments on the merits of the Petition from both parties.
- On January 18, 2019, the Orleans Court granted the Bronx Zoo's motion to transfer venue to Bronx County over the NhRP's objections.
- On July 8, 2019, the Bronx Zoo filed its Verified Answer ("Answer") in the Supreme Court, Bronx County and served it upon the NhRP on July 10, 2019. (Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is the Bronx Zoo's Answer).

#### THE BRONX ZOO'S ANSWER SHOULD BE STRICKEN

- 10. As fully explained in the accompanying Memorandum of Law, this Court should grant the NhRP's Motion to Strike for two reasons.
- 11. First, the Bronx Zoo's Answer was filed over seven months after the December 3, 2018 court-ordered deadline prescribed by the Order to Show Cause and is therefore untimely. See CPLR 7008(a) ("The return shall consist of an affidavit to be served in the same manner as an answer in a special proceeding and filed at the time and place specified in the wrif") (emphasis added).
- 12. Second, the Bronx Zoo's Answer was filed without required court permission. As the Bronx Zoo initially filed a motion to dismiss rather than a return, court permission to answer the Petition is required in the event the motion to dismiss is denied. See CPLR 404(a) ("If the motion is denied, the court may permit the respondent to answer, upon such terms as may be just") (emphasis added).
- 13. Significantly, as the Bronx Zoo's motion to dismiss and motion to answer were made "in the alternative" to transferring this case to Bronx County, they are no longer pending since the Orleans Court granted the Bronx Zoo's request to transfer venue.
- 14. But pending or not, neither the Orleans Court nor this Court has ruled on the Bronx Zoo's motion to dismiss or granted the Bronx Zoo permission to answer the Petition.
- 15. Further, the Bronx Zoo explicitly recognized and requested permission to answer the Petition in its Notice of Motion (see paragraph 6 above).
- No similar relief has been sought.
- 17. Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, I affirm that this motion is not frivolous.

WHEREFORE, I respectfully request that this Court grant the NhRP's Motion to Strike, together with such other and further relief as the Court may deem just, proper, and equitable.

Dated: August 2, 2019

Elizabeth Stein, Esq.

5 Dunhill Road

New Hyde Park, New York 11040

(516) 747-4726

lizsteinlaw@gmail.com

Attorney for Petitioner

# **EXHIBIT 1**

At I.A.S Part of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, held in and for the County of Orleans, at the Courthouse thereof, 1 South Main Street, Suite 3, Albion, NY on the day of October, 2018 november

PRESENT: HON. Trace A. Bannwter

Justice of the Supreme Court

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ORLEANS

In the Matter of a Proceeding under Article 70 of the CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,

THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on behalf of HAPPY,

Petitioner,

-against-

PROPOSED) ORDER TO **SHOW CAUSE** 

COPY

Index No.: 18-45164

JAMES J. BREHENY, in his official capacity as the Executive Vice President and General Director of Zoos and Aquariums of the Wildlife Conservation Society and Director of the Bronx Zoo, and WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY,

Respondents.

#### TO THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, That upon the annexed Verified Petition for a Common Law Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order to Show Cause of Elizabeth Stein, Esq. and Steven M. Wise, Esq. (subject to pro hac vice admission), filed the second day of October, 2018, the exhibits and and proceedings herein, the Respondents JAMES J. BREHENY, in his official capacity as the Executive Vice President and General Director of Zoos and Aquariums of the Wildlife Conservation Society and Director of the Bronx Zoo, and WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY, or their attorneys, are hereby ORDERED to SHOW CAUSE at I.A.S. Part \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Room \_\_\_\_\_\_, of this Court to be held at the Courthouse located at Courthouse Square, 1 South Main Street Suite 3, Albion, New York 14411-1497, on the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_\_ December 2018 at \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ of clock in the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ of that day, or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, why an Order should not be entered granting the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ("Petitioner"), the following relief:

- A. Upon a determination that Happy is being unlawfully imprisoned order her immediate release from Respondents' custody to an appropriate sanctuary, preferably the Performing Animal Welfare Society;
- B. Awarding Petitioner the costs and disbursements of this action; and
- C. Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

### It is THEREFORE:

ORDERED THAT, Sufficient cause appearing therefore, let service of a copy of this Order and all other papers upon which it is granted upon JAMES J. BREHENY, in his official capacity as the Executive Vice President and General Director of Zoos and Aquariums of the Wildlife Conservation Society and Director of the Bronx Zoo, and WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY, by personal delivery, on or before the definition of Member 2018, be deemed good and sufficient. An affidavit or other proof of service shall be presented to this Court on the return date fixed above.

	, that answering affidavits, if any, must be received by
Elizabeth Stein, Esq., 5 Dunhill Road,	New Hyde Park, New York 11040, no later than of
Lecenber, 2018. Reply papers, if any,	must be served on or before the 10th day of December
2018.	
Dated:, 2018 Albion, New York	Honorable Tracky A. Bannister

ENTER:

# **EXHIBIT 2**

1	STATE OF NEW YORK
2	COUNTY OF ORLEANS : SUPREME COURT
3	****************
4	NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., ON BEHALF OF HAPPY,
5	Plaintiff,
6	- vs - File No. 45164
7	JAMES J. BREHENY, Proceedings
8	Defendant.
9	****************
10	1 South Main Street Albion, New York
11	December 14, 2018
12	
13	
14	BEFORE:
15	HON. TRACEY A. BANNISTER, Supreme Court Justice
16	Supreme Source Substitute
17	
18	APPEARANCES:
19	STEVEN M. WISE, ESQ., ELIZABETH STEIN, ESQ.,
20	KEVIN R. SCHNEIDER, ESQ., Appearing on Behalf of the Plaintiff.
21	KENNETH A. MANNING, ESQ.,
22	JOANNA J. CHEN, ESQ., CHRISTOPHER J. McKENZIE, ESQ.,
23	Appearing on Behalf of the Defendant.
24	
25	
	COLLEEN L. LOUNSBURY

OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

THE COURT: Good morning, everybody.

Welcome to Albion. For those of you who aren't local, what a beautiful it is, isn't it?

So we are here this morning. I read a forest full of papers with regard to all of your positions, and it's my understanding that the cameras will only focus on the attorneys and what they have to say; is that right? We are all good with that? We'll go from there.

Counsel and I have agreed to a time limit schedule, which no one will get shot for violating it, but I'm hoping to try to make it a reasonable amount of time on each side with time for rebuttal.

In that regard, folks representing the subject of these proceedings, Happy, the elephant, you may proceed.

MR. WISE: Thank you, Your Honor, and thank you for allowing me to argue.

Your Honor, the Nonhuman Rights Project is bringing -- seeking a common-law writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Happy, a forty-seven-year-old elephant who is detained in the Bronx Zoo.

We are seeking a habeas corpus -- not only under the common-law, but also under the CPLR that actually governs the procedure.

So one of the things that we have to persuade the Court is that Happy is a person under Article 70.

Now, a person is an entity who has the capacity for rights. Oftentimes, people don't understand what a person is, but a person is not necessarily a rights holder, but it's a person under the common-law, and under the Article 70 who has the capacity for rights.

So if I may quickly give a short

demonstration. So, for example, this bottle of

water -- each drop in it has a legal right. If I

pour it onto the floor, nobody has legal rights.

What happens is you have to have a place to pour the

rights in -- in other words, a rights container, and

at that point, the container has rights and law. We

call the container a person. So a person is a

container only. However, then the question is what

rights do they have.

Now, it's important to understand that when you're looking at a personhood -- at a person who is a container, being a person does not necessarily mean that one has any rights at all. It just means that you have a capacity for rights.

So the Nonhuman Rights Project here -- the

COLLEEN L. LOUNSBURY OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

pet trust statute that we spoke to made certain animals -- nonhuman animals -- domestic animals and made them beneficiaries of trust, and for New York to be a beneficiary of trust, you have to be a person. So the legislature has already made certain nonhuman animals within the State of New York domestic animals persons for a single right.

So the legislature, in essence, created the personhood and poured in the single right. The Nonhuman Rights Project now comes to you on behalf of Happy, saying -- assuming that Happy has that one right already, but other nonhuman animals.

We ask you pour in the second rights so that Happy would have the right not only to be the beneficiary of a person, but now to have the common right of liberty that is protected by a common-law writ of habeas corpus.

So we must show that Happy is a person.

The way we show Happy is a person is by implicating the Court of Appeals case from Byrn from 1972. Byrn made it clear that being a person and being a human being are not synonymous.

In that case, it had to do with a person -- with if it was a human being who was a fetus, the Court said that while she was still a human, a fetus

was not a person. It made it clear that personhood is an issue not of biology, but it has to be a matter of public policy.

So a lot of what the Nonhuman Rights

Project has put in its petition and memorandum is

what we argue as appropriate public policy for this

Court to determine whether Happy is a person solely

for the purpose of common-law writ of habeas corpus.

Now, you have the fact part and you have the law part. The law part we argue is both as a matter of common-law liberty and as a matter of common-law equality.

We argue that that's the public policy that would allow this Court and require this Court to find that Happy is a person.

By liberty, what we do is we focus on the fact that Happy is an autonomous being, and we have one of our experts define autonomy as a being who is able to freely choose how to live her life. You and I are almost automatically autonomous. Happy also is autonomous.

So I'll say Rivers versus Katz. I'll cite the Storar case. These have to do with showing what the Court of Appeals -- showing the fact that what judges do -- an important part of being a judge in

State of New York and elsewhere in the common-law world is to protect the autonomy of those who are coming to the Court, because they are autonomous, and the autonomy is not being protected, whether it's like Rivers versus Katz in the context of a --someone who has to make a medical decision or it's in the context of a writ of habeas corpus, because what else is the major purpose throughout the seven hundred years there has been a writ of habeas corpus of autonomy, except to protect -- I'm sorry -- a writ of habeas corpus -- except to protect autonomy.

Because when one is being detained illegally against her will, then what is the fundamental wrong that's being done is that her autonomy is being trespassed upon. She is essentially forced to live as a slave. She cannot decide -- Happy, for example, cannot decide where to go. She can't decide who to go with. In fact, Happy is unable to do anything except live on a postage size piece of land approximately one acre.

The Nonhuman Rights Project is asking actually for a two-step process, because in habeas corpus involving a competent versus incompetent person who is being detained, there's a one-step process sometimes, and there's a two-step process

1 sometimes.

The one-step process means if I was being detained, then I would simply -- once I want a writ of habeas corpus, I would simply be ordered free and walk out.

If you have a detainee who is incompetent -- for example, throughout the history of New York, there have been slave children.

There's child oppression and minors who are wrongly being held in a mental hospital or in a jail. When they are free of a writ of habeas corpus, then you then have to move into a two-step process, because the Court will then order Happy free, but Happy is incompetent.

Then you have to take the second step of making a decision as to where Happy would go. The Nonhuman Rights Project said, "We suggest there are three elephant sanctuaries in the United States. We suggest, Performing Animal Welfare Society, which is twenty-three hundred acres large compared to where Happy has been confined for forty years on one acre.

So just to reiterate real quickly what I said in the brief, the difference between one acre at the Bronx Zoo and twenty-three hundred acres in PAWS is the same difference between -- the same

ratio as the City of Albion and the State of Illinois.

THE COURT: Are you saying that maybe Happy is unhappy in the Bronx Zoo?

MR. WISE: Happy is -- yes, I am saying Happy is unhappy. However, we are definitely not attacking the conditions of confinement, which we have said over and over again.

We learned our lesson in the Kiko case, where the Court believed for reasons which we didn't understand at the time -- but we realized we must have caused confusion and that we were attacking the conditions of confinement. We are not.

For example, if this Court was kidnapped and brought to some place and sought a writ of habeas corpus, the subject of the writ of habeas corpus wouldn't be whether this Court was being fed properly or whether getting medical care. That wouldn't be the issue. The question wouldn't be a matter of your welfare or your conditions of confinement.

The question would be whether or not you have a right not to be there at all. It's the exact same thing with Happy, the elephant. The question is not whether the Bronx Zoo is treating her well,

or whether its not treating her well, or whether they are giving her medical care, or they are not. The question is whether or not Happy should be confined there at all.

So the Nonhuman Rights Project is also making it clear that her confinement is illegal, and the reason that it is illegal is -- again, we go back to Byrn, and we talk about the issue of public policy.

Now, there's two grounds for public policy.

One is we argue that as a matter of common-law

liberty, she is being deprived of that. Again,

that's because she is autonomous, and the purpose of

habeas corpus is to protect that like in cases like

Rivers versus Katz. Rivers versus Katz says that's

an extremely important job for this Court.

The second one is the idea of common-law equality. Now, there's not much law on that, because once the Fourteenth Amendment came in, people stopped filing common-laws equality suits, and again, filing Fourteenth Amendment ones.

We went back to a 1992 law review article by Chief Justice Kaye, who talked about the fact that the common-law and Constitutional law have become a two-way street, and the common-law was

essentially being in certain ways constitutionalized.

We said then with respect to equality that we'd look to the case of Romer versus Evans in the U.S. Supreme Court, saying that like the New York courts -- if a court is looking at the constitutionality of a statute, it requires that it be a rational means to a legitimate end.

This Court itself, when it makes a decision, would do no less. This Court would want to then make sure that what it is ordering or overseeing is whether or not its order is a rational means to a legitimate end.

Now, we argue that the State has no -absolutely no legitimate interest in seeing the
arbitrary confinement of an autonomous being. It
doesn't matter whether the autonomous being is a
human or an elephant, because the issue is not the
species. Judge Fahey made it clear that -- that's
what he was saying. The issue is not the species.

In the Fourth Department -- in the Graves case, it also made it clear that it's common knowledge that animals can be persons. The Byrn case made clear that it's not a matter of species. It's a matter of -- a second matter of biology.

It's a matter of public policy.

The second prong of the equality argument is that when the Court said that you cannot look -- the U.S. Supreme Court said that you can't look at a single characteristic and deprive an entity of all of the rights because of a single characteristic.

In some ways and other ways, it's saying that I'm looking at it as a matter of species. If you say -- if Happy was a human being, it would be absolutely clear because of who she is, the autonomy of her species that she would have to be loose. She would have to be freed. However, the only reason that she might not get a writ of habeas corpus according to my brother would be because she is an elephant.

That's so fundamentally unfair. It just simply points to the fact she's an elephant when what the courts are trying to protect is autonomy -- not a species, but autonomy.

Now, I want to make sure -- I also hit the fact that we, indeed, are seeking immediate release. Again, we are sorry we confused the Fourth

Department when we went in front of the Kiko case.

We indeed are seeking immediate release. That's the only relief we are seeking as part of the habeas

1 corpus case.

If you look at, for example, the slave cases we cited -- you have cases in Massachusetts and you have cases in New York where the Courts freed slave children from slavery. That is what the whole case is about. Then at the end, we say, "We are going to have to figure out what we are going do with her." That's the step two.

But that's not really part of the habeas corpus case. That's after you prevailed in the habeas corpus case. The question is what is the remedy. Where are you going to put this incompetent, because Happy unlikely can't go back into the wild, so Happy is going to have to go somewhere, and that somewhere is going to have to be some kind of an elephant sanctuary.

The elephant sanctuaries that we'd ask the Court to send her to would be one of three. By the way, one is the Performing Animal Welfare Society in California. A second one is the Elephant Sanctuary of Tennessee, which is not only a sanctuary, but it's an AZA accredited zoo. I have seen that place. We would be happy if Happy went to either PAWS or the Elephant Sanctuary of Tennessee, which is an AZA accredited zoo. I don't know how long I've been

1 talking.

THE COURT: More than ten minutes.

MR. WISE: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Thank

you.

MR. MANNING: Your Honor, Ken Manning from
Phillips Lytle on behalf of Respondent, James
Breheny and the Wildlife Conservation Society. With
me is Chris McKenzie of general counsel from the
Wildlife Conservation Society.

One thing we do agree on is that Happy is an elephant. We have three affidavits from the people at the Bronx Zoo, a veterinarian, and people with a biology background, indicating the good care and treatment afforded to Happy, and we contend Happy is happy where she is.

During the recitation from NRP, there wasn't a peep about the controlling precedent from all four Appellate Divisions from this Court indicating that elephants, or chimps, or any animal for that matter is simply not the beneficiary of a habeas corpus petition, because they are simply not a person.

The position of NRP, in essence, isn't that Happy is being unlawful detained. They are contending that her being at the zoo should be

unlawful as a matter of public policy.

While the public policy position was articulated well by NRP on their behalf, that's a legislative initiative and not a matter for a Court.

What NRP is trying to do is hijack the judicial system to present the public policy position against all species. It's clear to us that NRP will go species to species, animal to animal, courthouse to courthouse, until they find someone to agree with their position. So far, they are unsuccessful.

At some point, our judicial system has a number of documents to prevent the repetitive litigation of the same issue. I've never had a case from all four departments. This is a first for me.

They haven't even addressed those decisions, because there's no place for them to go as a matter of Appellate authority. The authority relies upon the people, and the only authority they rely upon is dicta, as we indicated in our papers, or a concurring opinion on the denial to the Court of Appeals by the esteemed Judge Fahey.

Before you get to any of that, the question is why are we in this county. I mean, we agree that the CPLR controls the procedure here. The Court

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raised the issue in the first conference on the order to show cause. CPLR Article 5 indicates that this matter should be held in the Bronx. You don't have to take my word for it. You can take the word of the Second Department in the Greene Case, where it's decided Article 5 has been a habeas corpus proceeding.

Orleans County is a beautiful place. This courthouse is spectacular, but it has nothing to do with the Bronx Zoo. It has nothing to do with Happy, and it doesn't have anything to do with anything in this case any more than any other county.

You may recall counsel offered to stipulate if the Court changed venue to any other county within the Fourth Department. We certainly don't accept the offer. It underscores that all this is about is trying to shop the case to find a judge who will agree with their position.

Our Appellate Division -- each of them -- discouraged this form of forum shopping in an effort to prevent the judiciary from being used basically as a series of motions for reconsideration based on what other courts have done. We think the Appellate Division's decision -- particularly the Lavery

case -- is right on point.

The Fourth Department, less than five years ago, decided the case involving NRP involving a chimpanzee. Counsel referenced to it as the Kiko case. In the Appellate Division -- I don't think the Appellate Division misunderstood that case at all. I think they looked through the two-step transaction to find that all this is really about is changing the conditions in captivity of the elephant.

We try to drill through this, because discovery isn't available in this proceeding, and we didn't serve an order. We served some requests for admissions. The motion is also pending before the Court, but we won't spend the time on the oral argument.

We tried to pin down -- in our request for admissions, we asked NRP to admit that NRP doesn't allege that Happy's living conditions at the Bronx Zoo are unsuitable, and we also asked them to admit that NRP doesn't seek improved welfare for Happy.

They refused to answer. They raised an objection. The only objection raised was the objection on the grounds that the admission sought constitutes the very dispute of this lawsuit. Well,

of course, it does. What they are seeking to do is take Happy from an environment where she has been for forty years --

THE COURT: Forty-seven.

MR. MANNING: She has been at the Bronx Zoo for forty out of forty-seven years, Your Honor. She is comfortable there. They are trying to move Happy to some place they would rather see her be.

The Appellate Division Fourth Department in Kiko decided the changes and conditions are simply not the proper subject of a habeas corpus proceeding. We suggest the Appellate Division got it right, and that's for another day. We think it controls the decision in this case.

From our perspective, this case should be heard in the Bronx and not in Orleans County. In any event, the petition should be barred under a number of documents based on the Appellate Division saying in all four departments collateral estoppel.

It's obvious that what we talked about today is the position of NRP insofar that they seek to make persons out of animals in a variety of species, and it really has very little to do with Happy's own circumstances. That type of policy-based opportunity should be directed to the

legislature and not the Court in a habeas corpus proceeding.

In the limited time we've had to respond to the petition, Your Honor, we directed our efforts towards the Bronx Zoo and Happy, and we raised all of those issues.

There also has been an amicus filing by a number of interested groups that deal with the impact unprecedented and unsupported decision, granting what habeas corpus would have on the rest of the world.

We adopt those positions as this brief is a subject of a motion of a file, which we support, and we note that counsel has basically already put in opposition papers on the brief. We would ask the Court accept both their papers and the amicus papers to flesh out the impact that this decision would have on other people, other animals, and other industries for that matter.

Lastly, we'd note that among the last minute motions made is a motions for preliminary junction. All we would say is there is no basis right now. There's no intention on the part of the Bronx Zoo to move Happy anywhere.

In order for us to have the opportunity to

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handle the animal properly, we are not willing to consent to have any control on behalf of NRP over where the animal is or where the animal goes.

In order to support preliminary injunction, they have to show a meritorious petition for the reasons we just went through. The petition has no merit if the Court chooses to reach the merits.

That's our position, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you have rebuttal?

MR. WISE: Yes, Your Honor. Number one, if they move Happy out of the State of New York, this Court likely loses subject matter jurisdiction. The courts are very jealous of the subject matter jurisdiction.

What we didn't say is that we had a similar problem in the Third Department with respect to Tommy, the chimpanzee, and that the Third Department did issue a preliminary injunction ordering that Tommy not be moved. It was for that reason that the Court didn't wish to lose subject matter jurisdiction while it was ruling. That's one.

Second of all, it doesn't matter whether my brother's expert -- I guess they aren't really experts. They are employees of the Wildlife Conservation Society. It doesn't matter whether

Happy -- they think Happy is happy.

The issue is whether or not Happy is being detained against -- without respect -- to honoring her common-law right to liberty as a matter of liberty and equality, which my brother didn't even address.

I cite several cases involving the 1840s involving slave children, involving Sojourner

Truth -- Sojourner Truth Child. In the State of New York and also in Massachusetts where you had a slave child who was five years old or seven years old who would actually be holding the legs of their master and saying, "I don't want to go. I don't want to go," and the Court would say, "You don't really understand what slavery is about," or "You don't understand what your life will be. We'll remove you from slavery," and you couldn't expect them to understand.

Happy has been in prison in the Bronx Zoo for forty years. Everything about her evolution -- everything about who she is as an elephant is being impinged by that every single day. She has no idea what it would be like to move to a place that's twenty-three hundred acres where she would be able to be part of a herd and live with other elephants

and make choices that she has no way of fathoming.

Right now, as you can see, instead of checking her feces and checking her blood and checking her teeth every day -- and they are right. They ought to be worried about her, because she is being kept in a bizarre way on one acre of land which she shares with another elephant who hates her. That is not the way for an elephant to be. The elephant killed her only companion ten years ago. That's one thing.

The second thing is this isn't a matter for the legislature. Habeas corpus in New York is entirely a matter for common-law. In fact, these kinds of cases began with the Somerset case, which we talked about in 1772, which is actually part of New York Common-law. It was part of the common-law in New York in April 1775. That is where you began the entire idea of writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a slave.

Indeed, as Lord Mansfield said, "If you don't like what I did, then go to Parliament." They went to Parliament and they couldn't overturn it.

What happened is he said that slavery was so odious that the common-law wouldn't support it.

Slavery is still odious. No matter which autonomous

thing is being displayed, it's still odious to the autonomous being.

If the legislature would step in and try, under Tweed versus Liscomb, in the suspension clause, it's not clear how much the legislature even can try to step in and narrow who is a person or cut back on some other common-law issue.

Also, of course, I mentioned all of the other cases involved. First of all, the Second Department case and the Fourth Department case were not on the merits. You have the two Lavery cases in the Third Department and in the First Department.

Now, if the Court relies upon either of the Lavery cases -- one is saying you have to be able to bear rights and duties in order to be a person -- not for purpose of habeas corpus, but a person for any purpose, or you look at the First Department saying that you don't have to have a matter to be able to bear rights and do these. You have to be a human being.

That is what was foreclosed by the Byrn case. The Byrn case said that a person -- that's not a matter of biology. It's a matter of public policy.

Neither the Third Department nor the First

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Department ever got into the issue of the public policy, and I guarantee you -- well, as much as lawyers can -- no Court is going to follow the Third Department. It's the only English-speaking case in the history of the world that ever said that only entities who can bear duties can ever be persons.

As the First Department even noted, there are millions of New Yorkers who can't bear duties, but they are a person. They understand the fragility and the weakness of the Third Department's decision themselves.

They said, "What is really important is the fact that the chimpanzee wasn't a human being."

Well, that, again, has already been disposed of thirty years or forty years before by the Brown case.

Then when the pet trust came in, the legislature made it clear there are all kinds of nonhuman animals. They have personhood. They have the capacity for rights, and the one right they had there was to be a beneficiary of the trust. But neither the First or the Third Department seemed to grasp that.

However, since that time Judge Fahey -- we understand he is only a single judge, but he's the

only high court judge in the United States who ever opined on this.

Also, I believe that his decision is much more persuasive than either the First or Third. For one thing, he's the only one that actually made public policy arguments or tried to justify what he said.

In the Third Department, all they have is a one-sentence footnote, footnote three. In the First Department, they said that you had to be a human as part of a phrase in one sentence. There is a difference between making a reasoned argument based on public policy and simply stating something.

Then -- and I don't think it's a coincidence -- one month after Judge Fahey makes his decision, then the Fourth Department -- which, of course, binds this Court -- says that it's a commonplace, a nonhuman matter. A corporation that is a nonhuman animal can be persons.

That automatically means that this Court cannot rely upon either the Third Department or the First Department, because both of them said that a nonhuman animal can't under any circumstances be persons.

So they may ultimately be held right, which

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I hope not, but they may be. That's not what it is today. Today it's the law of the Fourth Department. The Fourth Department made it clear that this is a commonplace that nonhumans can be persons, and the only issue is under what circumstance. That requires not a biological explanation, but a mature reflection upon public policy.

My last thing or two is the issue of standing. The issue of standing is absolutely clear under 7002(a). Anyone can go in on behalf of anyone as being imprisoned, and the First Department said that the Nonhuman Rights Project undisputedly has standing.

Also, Justice Jaffe in the New York County
Supreme Court said that the Nonhuman Rights Project
did have standing to sue on behalf of the
chimpanzee.

So the First and Third Departments are simply outliers -- not just -- and the reason the First Department -- well, they are both outliers, and it's unlikely that everyone is going to follow them, because they are so extraordinary.

The First Department is especially troubling by the fact they simply say, "Only humans can be persons." We say we have so been there

before, because at one time, only white people could be a person. Only men could be a person. Chinese people couldn't be persons. Native Americans couldn't be persons. We have been there before. We don't need to go there again.

My very last thing is one second on venue. Venue is completely clear. 7002(b)(3) says that anyone seeking a writ of habeas corpus can file suit before any justice anywhere they want. There's no privilege for any Supreme Court.

We didn't make any bones about the reason we wanted to file in the Fourth Department, because the Graves case is not only favorable to us, but it's actually morally correct and legally correct, and why would we want to file suit.

The fact is that when you say that you may file in front of any justice of the Supreme Court, it's forum shopping, and it's forum shopping that the legislature says, "Well, you're welcome to it. You choose whatever Supreme Court Justice you want to go in front of." That's all right. Indeed, that draws its roots deep into the common-law of habeas corpus, which -- habeas corpus is just not like anything else. It's a generous cause of action.

THE COURT: Your time is up.

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MR. WISE: Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Mr. Manning?

MR. MANNING: Thank you, Your Honor. What we just heard is that the Third Department got it wrong. The First Department had it wrong. The Fourth Department had it wrong, and the Second Department had it wrong.

All of these issues have been decided at the Appellate level previously. While I admire the strength of the dispute over the rulings, the rulings nevertheless are direct and they are on point.

All the decisions relied upon for the argument today are indirect cases involving human beings, and they cite to the Graves case, the Fourth Department decision, which dealt with auto dealership. None of those cases are on point.

Judge Fahey's decision, which was a concurring opinion on a denial of leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals, is not authoritative on any of these issues.

From our standpoint, Your Honor, the

Appellate courts and the State already dealt with
each of the issues. We think the Appellate Division
on the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Department

got it right on each occasion, and we think the decisions are quite that way for this Court.

If the Court reaches the merits for the petition of habeas corpus, we ask the petition be denied, and Happy remain where Happy is right now.

THE COURT: I can say this is probably the most unusual case that I've sat on in my ten years on Supreme Court and the twenty years prior to that working for the Court.

I've always enjoyed elephants. My biggest worry here is -- let's put it this way: I certainly agree. Your 7002(b)(3) does permit you to bring a writ for habeas corpus before any judge, but I think then 7004(c) basically says the writ is returnable, and it tells you where it's returnable.

I believe that you could have asked any judge in the Supreme Court to sign your papers to start off your writ of habeas corpus proceeding, but it needed to be made returnable before some county that had any -- some nexus to this elephant and his condition -- his conditions of captivity.

I'll just read this part. It says, "It shall be made returnable before a justice of the Supreme Court or a county court judge being or residing within the county where the person is

detained."

or this animal is a person within the meaning of the law, that animal is being detained in the Bronx County. I don't think it's even questionable that this proceeding should be there. I did mention to you on the phone, just so that I didn't surprise you all, that it was my thought that this belonged there.

I have to say, though, that after I read all of your paperwork, I more strongly believe that this case belongs in the Bronx and that has to do with all of the paperwork that I received from both sides, which I found quite interesting.

The experts that were -- or the learned opinions that I got on behalf of Happy to move or change his conditions indicated that there were certain facts that they relied upon, and the experts or learned information that I got with regards to the Bronx Zoo and the folks on the other side indicated that, in fact, Happy is happy where he is at, and that there, in fact, would be impacts on Happy if changes were to be made to his conditions that he is currently being held in.

So I definitely believe that regardless of

any of the big underlying issues, that it's going to come down to at some point for a judge of the Supreme Court to decide whether or not Happy needs to be moved and where, and those decisions will require, in my opinion, adhering.

It will require experts to testify on both sides, and I probably can't imagine a more inconvenient place for this case to be than in Albion New York. I might be able to think of a couple, but this would be among the most inconvenient places for the parties to actually have any kind of a hearing. I certainly am not going to be bringing up employees and experts and having them fly to cities in New York and drive an hour to get there.

The Bronx is a convenient place. The witnesses of the conditions of Happy's confinement are there, and I would say that any experts that you would bring in or alert folks to contest that -- they would also find it much easier to get to the Bronx than to Albion, New York.

I think that's why there are rules. That's what CPLR says. To the extent that there are any issues that you're asking this Court to decide that transcend venue, I do not want -- realizing that

another Supreme Court judge is on the same level as me, I wouldn't want to have that judge in a position that he disagreed with me and is stuck, in fact, with any of my determinations where the same level of judge -- and therefore, I'm going to reserve for the judge in the Bronx County, where I'm sending this case, on any of the decisions on any of the important issues that you all raise so that he is not put in a position -- he or she is not put in the position of feeling like they have to act as an Appellate Court to any of my decisions on this case, except for change of venue, which I'm granting the defendant's motion to change venue and will be sending this to Bronx County.

MR. WISE: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WISE: If I just may make one attempt to change your mind?

THE COURT: One attempt, and I'll give Counsel an attempt to change it back.

MR. WISE: Thank you. I greatly appreciate this. With the greatest respect, I believe that is an improper decision. Number one, not only so that --

THE COURT: Just so you know, I'm not going

to act as my own Appellate Court either. Go ahead.

MR. WISE: Under 7002(b)(3), the case can
be filed in any -- before any judge. If the Court
notes --

THE COURT: No, it doesn't say --

MR. WISE: Any Supreme Court Justice.

THE COURT: It says you can get a writ from any --

MR. WISE: Any Supreme Court Justice.

7000(b)(1), (2), and (4) all specifically talk about the county of detention. So now we have been brought up to the place where this Court -- we brought the case to the Court.

The Court then can then issue the order to show cause and at that point, 7004 kicks in -7004(c) kicks in. At this point, this Court may then make it returnable to the county of issuance or the county of detention. So this Court made it -already made it returnable to the county of issuance. I don't believe that the Court has the power to change the venue, again.

THE COURT: I've never addressed that, but
I think just by signing the order to show cause -as you can recall, I was hesitant to sign the order
to show cause, but I didn't want to deprive you of

your ability to make a record that you asked this

Court to entertain these issues. That's really the

sole reason that I did issue the order to show cause

and had you all here today.

MR. WISE: If I may, in order to change the venue under CPLR 511(b) or 510(1), I believe, which we cite, the burden is on the respondent to show that the venue is in the wrong place.

THE COURT: They actually made that motion to change the venue.

MR. WISE: No, but then they have to show that the venue -- the present venue is wrong, but the present venue is not wrong. The present venue is correct. So they have not even tried to carry their burden of showing that -- which they must do in order to change venue.

You just can't change venue because they want venue changed. You have to show that the place for the venue is wrong. The place where the venue is right now is not wrong. It's correct. The reason it's correct is both under 7002 and also because this Court ordered the return to be made in the county of issuance.

So the Court didn't have to, but it did, and at that point, where we are today is a correct

venue. That means my brother has to show that it's not a correct venue, but it can't do that.

Therefore, the venue may not be changed at this point to another county.

THE COURT: Mr. Manning?

MR. MANNING: I will, Your Honor. If I could treat that for a motion of reargument, I'll keep it brief. The Court's decision to transfer the case to the Bronx not only comports to the statute the Court read to us, but it also comports to the Greene case in the Second Department, which specifically indicates Article 5 applies to the habeas corpus proceedings.

Not only have we met our burden -- I can't imagine what else we could do. The animal is in the Bronx. None of the witnesses are here. Orleans County doesn't have a thing to do with this case -- nothing -- nothing at all, except that's where we approached the Court to sign the initial order to show cause.

Even if we're wrong and it's perfectly proper to put it in Orleans County, the Court has the discretion -- which we also would move for -- to have the matter transferred to the Bronx on the theory that it makes the most sense, and it's an

1	appropriate place under Article 5.
2	So either way, frankly, the case belongs in
3	the Bronx. To the extent it's a motion for
4	reargument, we'd ask the Court to adhere to its
5	original ruling.
6	THE COURT: I put my reasons on the record,
7	and I'll stand by them. I do want to thank Counsel
8	for certainly an aluminating argument. It's a very
9	interesting issue, and I hope that it gets decided
10	to your satisfaction.
11	MR MANNING: Thank you.
12	THE COURT: Thank you.
13	MR. WISE: Thank you, Your Honor.
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# **EXHIBIT 3**

# SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF ORLEANS



In the Matter of a Proceeding under Article 70 of the CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus and Order to Show Cause,

THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on behalf of HAPPY,

NOTICE OF MOTION

Index No. 18-45164

Petitioner,

v.

JAMES J. BREHENY, in his official capacity as Executive Vice President and General Director of Zoos and Aquariums of the Wildlife Conservation Society and Director of the Bronx Zoo, and WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY,

Respondents.

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that, upon the attached affidavit of Kenneth A. Manning, Esq., sworn to December 3, 2018, with exhibits; the affidavit of James J. Breheny, sworn to December 3, 2018, the affidavit of Paul Calle, VMD, sworn to December 3, 2018, the affidavit of Patrick Thomas, PhD, with exhibit, sworn to December 3, 2018, and all papers and proceedings herein, Respondents James J. Breheny and Wildlife Conservation Society, by and through their attorneys, Phillips Lytle LLP, will move this Court at the Supreme Court, Orleans County, located at 1 South Main Street, Suite 3, Albion, New York 14411, on December 14, 2018 at 11:30 a.m., or as soon thereafter as counsel may be heard, for an order:

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- 1. Pursuant to CPLR 511 and 7004(c), transferring this proceeding to the New York State Supreme Court in Bronx County; or in the alternative,
  - 2. Pursuant to CPLR 3211(a),
    - a. dismissing the Verified Petition of Nonhuman Rights Project
      Inc., made on behalf of Happy the elephant, for a writ of
      habeas corpus, with prejudice, for failure to state a cause of
      action on which relief can be granted, for lack of standing, and
      pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel; or
    - in the event the Court does not dismiss the Verified Petition,
       allowing Respondents five days to answer to the Verified
       Petition pursuant to CPLR 404(a); and
- 3. Awarding Respondents' such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper, including costs and attorneys' fees.

Answering papers and notices of cross-motion, if any, must be served upon attorneys for Respondents in accordance with the Order of this Court dated November 16, 2018, and otherwise in accordance with CPLR. Respondents agree to accept service of the same via electronic transmission to the e-mail addresses stated below.

Dated: Buffalo, New York December 3, 2018 PHILLIPS LYTLE LLP

Yenneth A Ma

Kenneth A. Manning Joanna J. Chen

William V. Rossi

Attorneys for Respondents

James J. Breheny and

Wildlife Conservation Society

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Doc #01-3068745.1

# **EXHIBIT 4**

THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on behalf of HAPPY,

Petitioner,

٧.

JAMES J. BREHENY, in his official capacity as Executive Vice President and General Director of Zoos and Aquariums of the Wildlife Conservation Society and Director of the Bronx Zoo, and WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY,

Respondents.

# VERIFIED ANSWER

Index No. 18-45164

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Respondents James J. Breheny and the Wildlife Conservation Society (collectively, "Respondents"), by their attorneys, Phillips Lytle LLP, answer the Verified Petition ("Petition") of the Non-Human Rights Project, Inc. ("NRP") in this special proceeding as follows:

- 1. Paragraphs 1 and 2 characterize the relief sought by NRP in this special proceeding, and state legal conclusions concerning the same, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
  - 2. Respondents deny paragraph 3 of the Petition.
- 3. Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 purport to summarize *In re Nonhuman Rights*Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 31 N.Y.3d 1054 (2018) (Fahey, J. concurring), and Respondents refer to that opinion for its complete and accurate content, and otherwise deny the allegations in Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Petition.

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- 4. Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 5. Paragraph 12 purports to summarize In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 31 N.Y.3d 1054 (2018) (Fahey, J. concurring), and People v. Graves, 163 A.D.3d 16 (4th Dep't 2018), and Respondents refer to those opinions for their complete and accurate content, and otherwise deny the allegations in Paragraph 12 of the Petition.
- 6. Paragraph 13 purports to summarize In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, 31 N.Y.3d 1054 (2018) (Fahey, J. concurring), Byrn v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194 (1972), and People v. Graves, 163 A.D.3d 16 (4th Dep't 2018), and Respondents refer to those opinions for their complete and accurate content, and otherwise deny the allegations in Paragraph 13 of the Petition.
- 7. Paragraph 14 characterizes the relief sought by NRP in this special proceeding, and state legal conclusions concerning the same, to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 8. Paragraphs 15, 16, and 17 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 9. Respondents deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 18, and therefore deny these allegations.
- 10. The first and second sentences in paragraph 19 state legal conclusions that do not require a response. Admit only that elephants are intelligent and social animals, and otherwise deny the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Petition.

- 11. Paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 12. Respondents deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 37 and therefore deny these allegations.
- The first sentence in paragraph 38 is a legal conclusion that does not 13. require a response. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny the allegation. In response to the balance of paragraph 38, upon information and belief admit only that (i) Happy is an approximately 48 year-old female Asian elephant who "was captured in the wild and imported to the United States" when she was young; (ii) Happy was purchased by the Lion Country Safari, Inc. and lived elsewhere until approximately 1977; (iii) Happy, and a second elephant known as "Grumpy," arrived at the Bronx Zoo in or around 1977; (iv) Happy previously participated in events and gave rides but has not done so in decades; (v) Grumpy died in or around 2002, after she was attacked by two other elephants known as "Patty" and "Maxine"; (vi) in or around 2002, a female Asian elephant known as "Sammy" was introduced into Happy's environment at the Bronx Zoo; and (vii) Sammy died in or around 2006. Respondents deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation "[i]n 2005, Happy became the first elephant to pass the mirror selfrecognition test, considered to be a true indicator of an animal's self-awareness and '[]thought to correlate with higher form of empathy and altruistic behavior,'" and therefore, Respondents deny these allegations. Respondents deny the remaining allegations in paragraph 38.

- 14. Respondents deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraph 39 and therefore deny these allegations.
  - 15. Respondents admit the allegations in paragraphs 40 and 41.
- 16. Paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
  - 17. Respondents deny the allegations in paragraph 47.
- 18. Paragraphs 48 and 49 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 19. Regarding paragraph 50, Respondents deny that an order to show cause must be issued on behalf of Happy. The remainder of the allegations in paragraph 50 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 20. Paragraph 51 states legal conclusions to which no response is required.

  To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 21. Respondents deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraphs 52 and therefore deny these allegations.
- 22. Paragraph 53 states legal conclusions to which no response is required.

  To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 23. Regarding paragraph 54, Respondents deny that Happy's current living conditions are in any way unlawful. The remainder of the allegations in paragraph 54 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.

- 24. Paragraphs 55 and 56 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 25. Regarding paragraph 57, Respondents deny that they may be compelled to transfer Happy to the PAWS sanctuary. The remainder of the allegations in paragraph 57 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 26. Paragraphs 58, 59, and 60 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 27. Paragraph 61 purports to summarize *In re Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc.*v. Lavery, 31 N.Y.3d 1054 (2018) (Fahey, J. concurring), and Respondents refer to that opinion for its complete and accurate content, and otherwise deny the allegations in paragraph 61 of the Petition.
- 28. Paragraphs 62 and 63 state legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.
- 29. Respondents deny knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations in paragraphs 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, and 69, and therefore deny these allegations.
- 30. Paragraphs 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, and 117 are summaries of affidavits submitted by NRP in support of its Petition, and Respondents refer to them for their complete and accurate content. To the extent NRP purports to allege specific factual findings or observations made in the studies described in these paragraphs, Respondents deny

knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations, and therefore deny any such allegations.

31. Paragraph 118 states legal conclusions to which no response is required. To the extent a response is required, Respondents deny these allegations.

# FIRST DEFENSE

32. Happy's living conditions are in all ways lawful.

# SECOND DEFENSE

33. The Petition should be dismissed because it does not concern an imprisoned person.

# **THIRD DEFENSE**

34. The Petition should be dismissed because it seeks to change the conditions of Happy's confinement and does not seek her immediate release from confinement.

# **FOURTH DEFENSE**

35. NRP is barred from seeking the relief demanded in the Petition under the doctrine of collateral estoppel because the issues raised in the Petition were necessarily decided in prior litigation in which NRP had a full and fair opportunity to address them.

# FIFTH DEFENSE

36. The Petition should be dismissed under CPLR 7003(b) as a successive petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

# SIXTH DEFENSE

37. NRP lacks standing to bring the Petition.

# SEVENTH DEFENSE

38. The Petition seeks relief that is barred by the United States

Constitution and the New York State Constitution, including without limitation the fundamental principles of due process under the laws of the State of New York and the United States.

# EIGHTH DEFENSE

39. The Petition fails to satisfy a condition precedent to the grant of a writ of habeas corpus, including without limitation: (i) a petitioner who is a person; (ii) a violation of due process; and (iii) circumstances rendering continued restrictions on bodily liberty unlawful.

# **NINTH DEFENSE**

40. The Petition seeks relief that is barred by illegality.

# TENTH DEFENSE

41. The Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over NRP's Petition because Happy is not a person.

# **ELEVENTH DEFENSE**

42. The Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Happy because Happy is not a person.

# TWELFTH DEFENSE

43. The Petition asks the Court to render an advisory opinion concerning a legislative and/or political question, and thus it does not identify a justiciable controversy.

# THIRTEENTH DEFENSE

44. The Petition violates the doctrine of separation of powers because NRP seeks relief that should be requested from the New York State Legislature.

# **FOURTEENTH DEFENSE**

45. The relief sought in the Petition is barred by the applicable statutes of limitation and/or repose.

# FIFTEENTH DEFENSE

46. NRP does not have a legitimate legal interest in the relief sought in the Petition and cannot establish an injury-in-fact.

# SIXTEENTH DEFENSE

47. To the extent it states any viable grounds for relief, the Petition seeks relief that would not serve Happy's best interests.

WHEREFORE, Respondents James J. Breheny and the Wildlife
Conservation Society respectfully request that the Court enter judgment for them and
against Petitioner the Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc.

Dated: Buffalo, New York July <u>/</u>, 2019

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Kenneth A. Manning

Attorneys for Respondents

James J. Breheny and

Wildlife Conservation Society

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# **VERIFICATION**

STATE OF NEW YORK	)	
	)	SS
COUNTY OF ERIE	)	

KENNETH A. MANNING, being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I am a member of the firm of Phillips Lytle LLP, attorneys for Respondents James J. Breheny and Wildlife Conservation Society. I have read the foregoing Answer to Petitioner's Verified Petition and know the contents thereof, except as to the matters stated to be alleged upon information and belief; and the reason this verification is made by me is that Respondents are not in the county where I have my office.

Kenneth A. Manning

Sworn to before me this <u>/</u> day of July, 2019.

Notary Public

Doc #01-3670334

JOANNA JUNG YAO CHEN
No. 02CH6261196
Notery Public, State of New York
Qualified in Eric County
My Commission Expires 05/07/20 20