STATE OF NEW YORK: SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ORLEANS

In the Matter of a Proceeding under Article 70 of the CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,

THE NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on behalf of HAPPY,

Petitioner,

INDEX # 18-45164

- vs -

MOTION

JAMES J. BREHENY, in his official capacity as Executive Vice President and General Director of Zoos and Aquariums of the Wildlife Conservation Society and Director of the Bronx Zoo, and WILDLIFE CONSERVATION SOCIETY,

Respondents.

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50 Delaware Avenue Buffalo, New York Pt. 31 Chambers February 5, 2019

Before:

HONORABLE TRACEY A. BANNISTER Supreme Court Justice

Appearances:

STEVEN M. WISE, ESQ., ELIZABETH STEIN, ESQ., Appearing for the Petitioner via telephone.

KENNETH A. MANNING, ESQ.,
JOANNA J. CHEN, ESQ.,
Appearing for the Respondents via telephone.

KEVIN SCHNEIDER AND SPENCER LO, Present, via telephone.

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1	THE COURT: Let's begin. Everybody put your
2	appearance on the record starting with petitioners.
3	MS. STEIN: Elizabeth Stein for the Nonhuman Rights
4	Project.
5	MR. WISE: Steven Wise for the Nonhuman Rights
6	Project.
7	THE COURT: Okay. Respondents.
8	MR. MANNING: Ken Manning from Phillips, Lytle for
9	respondent.
10	THE COURT: Okay.
11	MS. CHEN: Joanna Chen with Phillips, Lytle for
12	respondent.
13	THE COURT: Okay. And then also on the line who
14	won't be speaking but have been invited to observe or listen
15	is Kevin Schneider, executive director of the NhRP, correct?
16	MR. SCHNEIDER: That is correct. Thank you, Your
17	Honor.
18	THE COURT: And Spencer Lo, also on staff with the
19	NhRP.
20	MR. LO: Yes.
21	THE COURT: All right. Then I'm going to allow the
22	petitioners to start your argument.
23	MR. WISE: Thank you, Your Honor. I'd like to just
24	begin immediately arguing the merits of the motion to
25	reargue. So CPLR 2221(d)(2) allows the petitioner to bring

a motion for leave to reargue which is what we're doing based upon matters of law or fact that were allegedly either overlooked or misapprehended by the Court in determining the respondent's motion to transfer venue to the Bronx County. In this argument, the petitioner intends to point out to this Court how it overlooked or misapprehended at least six matters of law and three matters of fact in its order to transfer the case to the Bronx County, and to argue that these matters individually and collectively required this Court to reverse its order and to proceed under Article 70.

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The six matters of law that Nonhuman Rights Project argued that this Court overlooked or misapprehended include, number one, the misapplication of CPLR 503(a), requirement of having a nexus or residence. We'll explain why it does not apply, and it's because habeas corpus is a special proceeding. Number two, is the misapplication of CPLR 510(1) which requires proof that venue in Orleans County was I will argue that venue in Orleans County was improper. actually proper, so 510(1) does not apply. The third matter of law would be the misapplication of CPLR 510(3), Subsection 3, which was neither raised, nor argued by the respondent, and will also demonstrate this doesn't have any legal basis to its application and case at bar. The fourth will be the failure of the Court to apply CPLR 506(a) when it does apply because habeas corpus is, indeed, a special

proceeding. Fifth will be the misapplication of CPLR 7004(c) to the motion to transfer because CPLR 7004(c) does not apply to motions to transfer. And also, even if it did apply, this Court misapplied CPLR 7004(c) by referring to the first sentence which only applies to detainees and state institutions, when the second sentence applies because the elephant is not a detainee in a state institution as the respondent is not a state institution. So the issue is -- actually there are two main issues. First of all, how does one acquire venue in a habeas corpus case. The second issue is then how do you transfer venue in a habeas corpus case. In that issue all three -- or both parties, the petitioner and respondent, as well as this Court, have some say in the matter.

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So, first of all, is that the respondent has repeatedly, and we argue erroneously, argued that CPLR 503(a) determines venue in this case. However, it does not apply because CPLR 503(a) prescribes the place -- or says that the place of trial shall be in the county in which one of the parties resides when it was commenced, or in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, which I believe has been abbreviated to mean a nexus. However, it has a major exception which is except as prescribed by law.

Now, the Nonhuman Rights Project said in order to

understand what is prescribed by law, this Court needs to go to CPLR 506. And the reason it needs to go to CPLR 506 is that a habeas corpus proceeding is a special proceeding.

And that, of course, is set out in CPLR 7001, the second sentence of which says that a proceeding under this article which is Article 70 is, indeed, a special proceeding.

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Now, CPLR 506 is directed to when where special proceedings are to be commenced. And it says that unless otherwise prescribed in Subdivision B, which applies to Article 78 doesn't apply to us, or in the law authorizing the proceedings, which would be Article 70, a special proceeding may be commenced in any county where the proceeding is triable. We argue that the proceeding is triable in the same counties in which the law authorizing the special proceedings says it may be commenced and that, indeed, is Article 70. So you then go to Article 70, and you look specifically at CPLR 7002(b)(3), and that says that except as provided in a paragraph that doesn't have any relevant case at bar, a petition for the writ should be made to, and Subsection 3, 7002(b)(3) says to any Justice of the Supreme Court. Now, the NhRP then decided for its own reasons to commence a petition for the writ in Orleans County, and it was done pursuant to CPLR 7002(b)(3) which it's allowed to do because of the fact that that's where CPLR 506(a) sends us. So the commencement by the Nonhuman

Rights Project in Orleans County was correct, and so that is where we properly acquired venue. Now, at this point, the petitioner's work in acquiring venue is over. Now it switches to the Courts. So at this point, CPLR 7003(a) sets up three actions that a Justice of the Supreme Court may take once the petitioner files in front of any Supreme Court Judge and acquires venue in that county. So it sets out three actions. One of the actions is, of course, that the Court may deny the writ. This Court did not deny the writ. Now that leaves two actions. One, it may issue the writ then in one of two ways, and those depend upon whether or not the petitioner seeks production of the detainee or not So if the petitioner wants the prisoner or the in Court. detainee brought into Court, then they seek a writ of habeas If they do not want the production of the detainee in Court, then the petitioner seeks an Order to Show Cause because that's exactly what it says. It says -- 7003(a) says the Court to whom the petition is made shall issue the writ without delay, dot, dot, or where the petitioner does not demand production of the person detained, that orders the respondent to show cause why the person detained should not be released. And I can point to the commentary to CPLR 7001 which just says the common law writ of certiorari to inquire into detention has been merged with habeas corpus. So, therefore, once it did that, the only

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significant difference between a writ of habeas corpus and a writ of certiorari to inquire into detention is that the former requires production of prisoner for hearing on the writ, and the latter dispenses with that. So we, the Nonhuman Rights Project, did not want Happy the elephant brought into Court which is why we urged the Court to issue an Order to Show Cause.

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Now, next is that once this Court has been issued the Order to Show Cause, then we move to CPLR 7004(c). that concerns the issue of where the issued writ or the Order to Show Cause is to be returnable; so that, in other words, where the venue is going to be. So there's two The first possibility is that CPLR 7004(c), possibilities. the first sentence says that a writ to secure the discharge of a person from a state institution shall be made returnable before a Justice of the Supreme Court residing within the county in which the person is detained. the detainee is being detained in a state institution, then the writ is to be made returnable in the county in which the detainee is detained. Now, that is the first sentence of CPLR 7004(c). In the case at bar, correctly the respondent has repeatedly agreed that it is not a state institution. That it is a nonprofit corporation. The first sentence of 7004(c) then does not apply to the case at bar because of the fact that the respondent is not a state institution.

And the second sentence of 7004(c) says that in all other cases, and obviously we're part of the in all other cases, it says the writ shall be made returnable in the county where it was issued, which would be Orleans County in this case, except that where the petition was made in the Supreme Court or to a Supreme Court Justice outside the county in which the person is detained, such Court or Justice may make the writ returnable before any Judge authorized to issue it in the county of detention. So at this point, this Court could have made the writ returnable -- it says it shall make the writ returnable in Orleans County, but it may make the writ returnable in the county of detention which would have been Bronx County. This Court then chose to make the writ, and properly so, under CPLR 7004(c) to make the writ returnable, the Order to Show Cause returnable, in the county of issuance which is Orleans County. Now, this marked the end of the process of acquiring venue. The petitioner has chosen the county pursuant to CPLR 7000 --

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THE COURT: Hold on one second. I'm just going to say this. All the things that you've read, I haven't heard you read the word venue once. Okay. I understand it talks about a writ being made to a Supreme Court -- any Supreme Court Justice or any Justice of the Supreme Court and made returnable, but not once does it say what you just concluded, okay, that that confers venue on this case in

that Court. Okay. I haven't heard you say venue. And I'm reading along with you, so it's not like I'm just listening to your words. I'm also reading the CPLR as we talk.

MR. WISE: Thank you. I greatly appreciate that. It is the same thing. That's where the case is heard.

THE COURT: All right. So your position is that means venue?

MR. WISE: It does mean venue, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Continue.

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MR. WISE: Thank you, Your Honor. Now, the respondent, however, now may weigh in because the respondent may now seek to transfer venue from the Court -- I'm sorry, from the county in which the petitioner chose, but more importantly in which the Court said it made the writ returnable. Now, the only way in which venue can be transferred is then through CPLR 510 or -- and 511. And if it's not transferred, or the petitioner does not seek to transfer, otherwise venue remains in the county in which the Order to Show Cause was made returnable which in this case would be Orleans County.

Now, on November 21st of 2018, the respondent filed its demand for change of venue. And it said that they demanded, quote, pursuant to CPLR Rule 511, that the venue of the above-captioned proceeding be changed from the County of Orleans, which obviously the respondent is agreeing with

us that the venue right now at that point is in the County of Orleans where it has been improperly placed to the County of Bronx where venue would be proper, and it gives three grounds. One of them is as provided by CPLR 503, by CPLR 510(1), and by CPLR 7004(c). Now, we've already seen that CPLR 503 does not apply because it does not apply to special proceedings. We have not yet talked about Section 510 -- CPLR 510(1), but CPLR 510(1), as I'll speak about in a minute, only applies -- are you with me?

THE COURT: I am.

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MR. WISE: Good. I touched something on my phone, and all of a sudden I got something new on the screen. wanted to make sure I didn't cut everybody off. 510(1), as we shall see, applies only when the county designated for the venue is not a proper county. So they must then under 510(1) show that Orleans is not a proper county, but they can't do that because under 7002(b)(3) and under 7004(c), both the petitioner and this Court have designated Orleans Supreme Court as the proper venue. Then they also at that point brought in 7004(c). 7004(c) is puzzling because 7004(c) as we talked about has the first sentence and the second sentence, and that occurs when the Judge is issuing under the writ of habeas corpus or the Order to Show Cause and has to make an initial determination as to where it will be returnable. It does not permit anyone to go back to it.

And in a situation that does not involve originally making the decision as to where the Order to Show Cause should be made returnable in the county of detention or in all other cases in the county of issuance, or sometimes in the county However, if the Judge decides it's in the of detention. county of issuance, then that is venue. Now, that's the three grounds that in their demand for change of venue they None of them are appropriate. However, then they filed a motion to transfer, and the motion itself was filed on December 3rd. And the motion itself, the notice of motion simply said that they wish to be heard for an order, and on page two it says pursuant to CPLR 511 and 7004(c), transferring this proceeding to the New York State Supreme Court in Bronx County. So at this point, they appear to have dropped 503(a), CPLR 503(a), and dropped CPLR 510(3). It's just not clear. They said the same thing that what is clear is again they claim that you can go back to 7004(c) and start over again as if you were initially making the argument -- as if you were initially deciding where the writ or the Order to Show Cause is to be returned. purpose of 7004(c), and that's the full purpose which is where is it to be returned, in the county of detention or in the county of issuance. Once the Court decides the county of issuance, that's where venue is; and you can't go back to 7004(c) unless for some reason there's a new writ that's

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going to be issued or there's a new Order to Show Cause that has been sought.

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THE COURT: Okay. I've got your argument.

MR. WISE: Okay. As well as the accompanied memorandum that they also said that they cited 503(a), but as we've discussed, 503(a) is not applicable because of the fact that this is a special proceeding. They also pointed out that the Nonhuman Rights Project did not identify any nexus. That is 503(a) language, and that is simply another way of saying 503(a). So 503(a), however, does not apply.

They then said that what the Nonhuman Rights

Project had done which is filing suit in Orleans County

somehow involved forum shopping. And the Nonhuman Rights

Project had not objected to this until finally it did

recently saying that forum shopping in New York implies that

the forum shopper is engaging in a fraud of the Court. The

Nonhuman Rights Project is not engaging in a fraud of the

Court; therefore, there cannot be any forum shopping.

Coming to the Court and saying this is what we're doing,

this is why we're doing it, we're entitled to do it under

Article 70, 7,0003 B 3, it's impossible that it can be forum

shopping. You can't forum shop in a place in which you are

allowed to be and which you announced to everybody exactly

what it is you're doing.

The third thing is they simply say 7004(c), but

they make the same error by going back to 7004(c), and imagining that that section can be employed in a situation other than deciding where the writ will be returned or where the Order to Show Cause will be returned.

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Now, in the December 14th, 2018, hearing though, this Court appeared to follow what the respondent did, and specifically went back to CPLR 7004(c), and saying that the writ, and I quote what the Court said, needs to be made returnable before some county that has some nexus to this elephant and her conditions of captivity, and then the Court cited to CPLR 7004(c), the first sentence. respectfully, the Nonhuman Rights Project argues that the nexus language is 503(a) language, CPLR 503(a) language, and that is irrelevant because this is a special proceeding. And that you do not go back to CPLR 7004(c) because the only time 7004(c) is used is under the circumstance of when the Court is deciding and what Court does it make the Order to Show Cause or the writ of habeas corpus returnable. only way that someone can move to transfer a case from one county to another county is by employing CPLR 511 and CPLR 510. And then the third error, respectfully, that the Nonhuman Rights Project sees is when the Court had that discussion, it then erroneously referred to CPLR 7004(c) first sentence saying it should be made returnable before a Justice of the Supreme Court or County Court Judge being and residing in the county where the person is detained, but that only applies in cases where the detainee is in a state institution. So for all three of those reasons, 503(a) simply is not applicable, 7004(c) is not applicable; and even if it was, the first sentence is not applicable because the Bronx Zoo is not a state institution.

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Now, finally we move up to the issue of 510 and specifically 510(1). In its notice of motion, in its memorandum, and in its motion itself, the respondent did not ever state that it was making its motion pursuant to 510. And so it has waived its ability to do that, or it should have waived it. If this Court says that -- and in the original notice of the intent to transfer which was not duplicated ever again anywhere else. In fact, if you look at the transcript of the December 14th hearing, the number 510 does not appear to come out of the mouth of any of the counsel for the respondent. But if you want to say that by stating its original notice to change venue it mentioned 510(1), well, the only thing it mentioned was 510(1). 510(1), again, allows a change of venue when the county designated for the purpose is not the proper county. requires the Bronx Zoo to demonstrate that Orleans was not a proper county.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. I've given you a lot of time. I'm interested in hearing the other side, unless

there's something that you haven't said that you need to say in a short time.

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I will say something just in a short MR. WISE: time which is that this Court then moved to 510(3) which provides for a change of venue when it can be deemed the material witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted This Court was not allowed to do that by that change. because the respondent did not ask -- did not invoke 510(3) in any way. Specifically under 510 the Court is not allowed to make any kind of a sua sponte decision. There is a case we cited, Mejia vs. J. Crew Operating Corporation, 140 AD3d 505 in the First Department where they specifically said that the Supreme Court erred in treating the motion to change venue under 510(1) as having been made under 510(3). And also just as important, that the commentary to CPLR 510 notes that there's a rigorous set of evidentiary requirements for a motion to change venue under 510(3), including you have to list the names, addresses, and occupation of the witnesses. You have to disclose the facts to which the witnesses will testify. You have to demonstrate the witnesses are actually willing to testify. You have to show that the witnesses would, in fact, be convenienced in the absence of a change of venue. perhaps the respondent did not intend to make a motion under 510(3), they never tried to meet that rigorous evidentiary

requirement. And even if they had, the commentary also notes that the focus on moving venue is on the convenience of witnesses or nonparties witnesses. You can't be an employee. You can't be a party. You can't be a person under control of the party. All of the applicants of the Bronx Zoo, all the names of the Bronx Zoo presented were employees of the Bronx Zoo. All the commentary also notes that the Court gives no weight to expert witnesses. Everyone agrees and this Court said that one of the main reasons the Court felt that a change of venue was appropriate was because of the expert witnesses. But the commentary and the cases make clear that you don't take into account the convenience of expert witnesses when you're trying to make that sort of a change.

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I will not talk about the three alleged misapprehension of the facts. We talked about it in the memos. But, in short, there are no statutes that support a change of venue. There's no CPLR's. There are no cases. There is nothing whatsoever that supports a change of venue from Orleans County to Bronx County. Orleans County is and always has been the proper venue. Bronx County is not a proper venue. It would have been a proper venue had this Court under 7004(c) initially had the Order to Show Cause returned to the Bronx. But once it didn't, the only way that it could be moved to the Bronx was if the respondent

made a proper motion under CPLR 510 and was able to prove that it did under one of those three subsections. It did not, and; therefore, this Court erred in the six ways in which I have stated. And this Court should then on reargument, the merits of the reargument, it should reverse its motion and allow the case to proceed pursuant to Article 70. Thank you so much for listening.

THE COURT: No problem. Mr. Manning or Joanna, which of you are going to make the argument?

MR. MANNING: I'm just coming out of an appointment at Strong Memorial with some experts, Your Honor. Joanna will take it for us.

THE COURT: Okay. Miss Chen.

MR. MANNING: Thank you.

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MS. CHEN: Thank you, Your Honor. We'll keep it brief because we believe that the Court decided correctly. The Court identified CPLR 7004(c) as the basis for where the writ should be made returnable. 7004(c) says that the writ may be made returnable in the county of detention, and the Court identified the Bronx County as the county of detention. In response to petitioner's arguments, nothing in 7004(c) forecloses the Court from making a decision to make the writ returnable in the county of detention. Even if assuming for the moment that you do agree with petitioner that you made the writ returnable in Orleans County, nothing

in CPLR 7004(c) says you can't make a further change with regard to the venue.

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With regard to Article 5, the Court has an alternative basis on which to transfer venue to the Bronx County. As we have reiterated in our papers, Greene v. The Supreme Court Westchester County and Appelton demonstrate that Article 5 and all of its provisions apply to habeas proceedings. They do not simply apply to CPLR 506. And if you look at CPLR 503(a), it requires a nexus to the place where the proceeding is going to be tried. Here it's undisputable that the Bronx County is where the Bronx Zoo is. It's undisputable it's where Happy is. And as a result of the considerations under 503(a), venue in Orleans County is improper under 510(1), and that's the basis that we moved on, and 511. And the Court touched upon the considerations during its decision.

Finally, the petitioner didn't raise the motion for permission to appeal to the Fourth Department in its argument, but we do note that there are no less than three Court of Appeals decisions holding that there are no appeals allowed from intermediate order in habeas proceedings. And we would suggest that those decisions are controlling and that the Court deny the motion for reargument, deny the motion for permission to appeal to the Fourth Department, and deny both of the accompanying motions to stay.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything further? Say your name whoever wants to talk.

MR. WISE: Miss Chen, are you finished? I didn't mean to interrupt you.

MS. CHEN: No, please go ahead.

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MR. WISE: Well, I won't talk about the merits of the motion to reargue anymore. And it's kind of an awkward procedural position to be arguing a motion for a stay during appeal because the Court hasn't issued an order, and we don't know what the order is going to be.

THE COURT: I have issued an order on the original motion.

MR. WISE: Yes, indeed. Thank you very much. So that would be -- yes, you are correct. I mistakenly forgot that. Okay. So then we do have a motion for leave to appeal, the motion for leave to appeal, and we have a motion for stay during that so this case does not start going off on two tracks. That's one of the reasons. There's not a motion for stay while we seek leave for appeal in this Court. And then we would be seeking a motion for leave to stay up in the Fourth Department. At that point, the Fourth Department would retain jurisdiction over the proceedings in the Bronx Court, and you can have the Bronx Court moving in one direction, you have the Fourth Department moving in another direction, unless the -- unless

either this Court or the Fourth Department issues the stay.

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Now, in trying to determine whether a stay should be issued, the Court has to weigh the prejudice of the moving party in denying a motion to stay versus the nonmoving party in granting a motion to stay. And the factors to consider should be does the appeal have merit, and I would argue that it's clear.

THE COURT: Right, and you've made that argument on the merits.

No, I'm not making that argument. I'm not making that argument again. I promise. However, we do think it's a powerful argument. Then you'd have to look at the prejudice to either side. The prejudice to our side, to Happy, is that Happy's liberty is at stake. The First Department where the Bronx is -- this isn't a venue argument. This is an argument about whether or not the First Department which does not -- which rejects the idea that a nonhuman animal can never be a person is going to make that decision. Or the Fourth Department, which at least in the Graves case, did not reject that. And also it's clear that what we argued is that the Fourth Department is in conflict with what Judge Fahey said. It's in conflict with the Court of Appeals case in Burns. It's in conflict with public policy as set forth in the New York Pet Trust case that makes nonhuman animals persons. The Fourth

Department is in harmony both with Judge Fahey's decision, with the Burns case, with the public policy; and also it has the case that is essentially on all fours with this, the In that case you not only have the petitioner Rivera case. seek a leave to appeal, but you ended up having the respondent do it. And the Rivera case said under CPLR 7001 and all the cases that are cited by the respondents, all immediately cite CPLR 7001 which are appeals to the rights or they cite cases that cite to CPLR 7001. What they say is that there is no appeal of rights. And we agree, the Nonhuman Rights Project agrees, that we do not have an appeal as a right from the Court's decision transferring the case to the Bronx. However, we do have a right to seek -to ask the Supreme Court and to ask the Fourth Department if it will give us permission, and we think we should be able to have permission because this is not only something that will involve Happy and involve every single day that Happy is now in the Bronx Zoo, we argue it is not the proper place for her to be, but it's also an important case with respect to the broader look at habeas corpus. We think that the respondent's arguments have never been made before. are no cases that the respondent can cite that it's ever upheld an argument that they are making, that somehow you are not allowed to even ask for leave to appeal. allowed to ask under the statute.

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THE COURT: I got you. And I do have to move this along. So is there anything else, Joanna, let me ask you — or let me ask both of you this question. We were in Court in Orleans County. And after I issued my ruling, I remember, Mr. Wise, you said to me, Your Honor, can I attempt to change your mind. Okay. And there was an objection by Mr. Manning that he said something to the effect that, well, there's your motion to reargue, et cetera. I mean, is there any merits to the argument that petitioner has already had a motion to reargue, and this is just another motion to reargue?

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MR. WISE: No, there's no merit to that at all. It couldn't have been a motion to reargue an order. The order was actually entered, for one thing, almost a month later. I couldn't have moved to reargue an order that was going to be entered that had not yet be entered and would not be entered until a month later. What I was doing was trying to end the oral argument which we had in a way in which I thought it should go which is that the Court should deny it. But there are requirements for how you file a motion to reargue. It's not a motion to reargue.

THE COURT: In other words, I should never let somebody do that in the future?

MR. WISE: No. Of course. It's part of the argument. In fact, the reason I said that is in over the

last 40 years of practicing law, if it looks like I'm not winning, I always say is there anything I can say, can I try this or try that, can I change your mind. On occasion I apparently am persuasive and it happens, but most of the time the Court does what the Court did now and said, no, you can't make me change my mind, so I'm going to rule for the other side. Under no circumstance is it a motion to reargue.

THE COURT: Okay. Miss Chen?

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MS. CHEN: Your Honor, I think the transcript speaks for itself in that the petitioner has already been given an opportunity to reargue its substantive arguments to the Court. There was no formal motion made with regard to reargument.

THE COURT: So I will tell you if, in fact, I accept your argument, that would probably be the last time I would allow anybody to argue after they've had the benefit of the Court's decision being expressed on the record.

Okay. The Court is supposed to have the last word. If I make a decision and if somebody asks to change my mind, I think I maybe have learned something in that, I will clarify whether they intend to waive their right to reargue based upon the fact that they're already rearguing. Okay. But that being said, the Court has listened, but the Court does feel regardless of the arguments of counsel that Orleans

County is not a proper county based on 503(a), 510(1), and 510(3). I believe that it is probably the most inconvenient place to have this case argued. And I can evidence that by the fact that we're on the telephone now, and that despite Court being in session on Friday, that because you didn't want or could not or, you know, found it difficult to come to Orleans to make an argument in person, you know, you've witnessed how difficult it is to have a case in such a remote county. Okay. And also one where there is simply no nexus whatsoever to Happy. So I have not changed my ruling whatsoever. And I'm not making any -- I'm not granting a motion for you to seek appeal. If you think you could seek it in some other way without my permission, go for it; but I'm not granting the permission. This case does not belong in Orleans County. Even if it thought it belonged in Orleans County a little bit, if I had any misgivings, I would give some serious thought to it. But there is simply no reason for this case to be in Orleans County, okay, no legal reason, no moral reason. And so I'm ending the comments, and I'm closing the record with what I just had to say. And, Kelly, how can they reach you to order the transcript if they wish?

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THE COURT REPORTER: It's 716-845-2146.

MR. WISE: Your Honor, what we intend to do is as soon as we get the transcript, to approach a Justice of the

1	Fourth Department. May we have a stay until we can do that?
2	THE COURT: Well, sure. You got a real short
3	window. If they'll talk to you, I have no objection to
4	that. So 30 days.
5	MR. WISE: Thank you, Your Honor. We're very
6	grateful for that. We appreciate it.
7	THE COURT: Not a problem. Thank you very much.
8	* * *
9	CERTIFICATION
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11	I certify that the foregoing 25 pages are a correct
12	transcription of the proceedings recorded by me in this matter.
13	N
14	Kelly A. RINEHART,
15	Official Court Reporter.
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