

STATE OF MICHIGAN  
MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT

NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant.

Supreme Court No. 169351

Court of Appeals No. 369247

v

Menominee Circuit Court  
LC No. 23-17621-AH

DEYOUNG FAMILY ZOO, LLC and  
HAROLD L. DEYOUNG,

Defendants-Appellees.

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**Motion for Leave to File Late Amicus Brief in Support of  
Plaintiff-Appellant's Application for Leave to Appeal**

*Amicus Curiae* Gary Comstock, Peter Singer, and Adam Lerner, by and through the undersigned counsel, respectfully ask that this Court grant them leave to file the attached late *Amicus Curiae* Brief, pursuant to MCR 7.305(F), and in support, state as follows:

1. *Amici* are scholars of ethics, moral psychology, and animal cognition with research focusing on the moral and legal implications of treating cognitively complex nonhuman animals – particularly great apes – as beings with interests in bodily liberty that the law should protect.
2. *Amicus* Peter Singer is the IRA W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics, Emeritus, at Princeton University. His publications in the 1970s are widely credited with creating the philosophical basis of the modern animal rights movement. His work in this area and in the area of our duties to those living in extreme poverty, are some of the most excerpted and reprinted essays in applied ethics anthologies. *Amicus* Gary Comstock, an award-winning researcher and teacher, is Alumni Distinguished Undergraduate Professor of Philosophy at North Carolina State University. His book, *Research Ethics: A Philosophical Guide to the Responsible Conduct of Research*, shows how Singer's


expanding circular metaphor lends coherence to an otherwise disparate set of issues in research ethics. *Amicus* Adam Lerner holds a PhD in philosophy from Princeton University and was previously a Post-doctoral Associate at the Center for Population-Level Bioethics at Rutgers University. His work has appeared in venues such as *The Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, and *Philosophical Studies*. *Amici* specialize in ethics and have particular expertise and interest in the analysis of issues relating to the moral status of animals.

3. This matter involves a matter of first impression in Michigan, i.e., whether habeas corpus relief is available to chimpanzees as legal “persons.”
4. As amici curiae, Peter Singer, Gary Comstock, and Adam Lerner may assist this Court by providing an expanded perspective on the important legal issues in this case. The decision of the Court of Appeals concluded that chimpanzees cannot be “persons” because they are unable to participate in a social-contract exchange of natural liberties for legal obligations. In their proposed brief, *amici* explain that this reasoning misinterprets the social-contract tradition, contradicts centuries of habeas jurisprudence, and produces untenable and discriminatory results.
5. Plaintiff-Appellant’s Application for Leave to Appeal was filed on November 28, 2025.
6. Defendant-Appellant’s Answer was filed on January 23, 2026. On February 6, 2026, this Court granted Plaintiff-Appellant’s motion to extend the time for filing its reply brief to March 6, 2026.
7. To date, three motions to file amicus curiae briefs have been filed in support of Plaintiff-Appellant’s Application for Leave to Appeal. Pursuant to MCR 7.305(F), amicus curiae brief would be due on February 13, 2026.
8. *Amici*’s brief consists of approximately 4,000 words.
9. *Amici* will electronically file and serve this motion and the proposed amicus curiae brief on all counsel of record in this matter.

**WHEREFORE**, Peter Singer, Gary Comstock, and Adam Lerner, through undersigned counsel, respectfully request that this Honorable Court GRANT their motion for leave to file a late amicus

curiae brief, and accept the attached proposed *Amicus Curiae* Brief (Exhibit 1), which is being filed with the Court along with this motion.

Respectfully Submitted,



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Dated: February 17, 2026

# EXHIBIT

1

**STATE OF MICHIGAN  
IN THE SUPREME COURT**

NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT,  
INC., on behalf of Prisoner A (aka  
Louie), Prisoner B, Prisoner C,  
Prisoner D, Prisoner E, Prisoner F,  
and Prisoner G (“DeYoung  
Prisoners”),

Petitioners-Appellants,

vs.

DEYOUNG FAMILY ZOO, LLC and  
HAROLD L. DEYOUNG,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Docket No. 169351  
Docket no. 369247  
Menominee Circuit Court  
LC Case No. No. 23-17621-AH  
Hon. Mary B. Barglind

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**JUDGMENT OR ORDER APPEALED FROM**

Amici curiae Gary Comstock, Peter Singer, and Adam Lerner adopt plaintiffs-appellants' statement of the basis of this Court's jurisdiction.

**RELIEF REQUESTED**

Amici curiae Gary Comstock, Peter Singer, and Adam Lerner concur in plaintiffs-appellants' request for relief.

## INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE

Gary Comstock is Alumni Distinguished Undergraduate Professor of Philosophy at North Carolina State University.

Peter Singer is the Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University. Journalists have called him the “world’s most influential living philosopher.”

Adam Lerner is student at Yale Law School.

Amici are scholars of ethics, moral psychology, and animal cognition. Their research focuses on the moral and legal implications of treating cognitively complex nonhuman animals—particularly great apes—as beings with interests in bodily liberty that the law should protect. They submit this brief to assist the Court in evaluating whether the four chimpanzees confined at the DeYoung Family Zoo possess the type of liberty interest that entitles them to seek habeas corpus relief under Michigan law.

The interests of the Amici bring expertise bearing directly on the Court of Appeals’ core holding: that chimpanzees cannot be “persons” for purposes of habeas corpus because, in the court’s view, only beings capable of assuming legal duties and responsibilities may hold legal rights. See *Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v DeYoung Family Zoo, LLC* \_\_\_ Mich App\_\_\_ (Docket No. 369247, rel’d 10/27/25), slip op. at 13, quoting *Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v Breheny*, 197 NE3d 921 (NY, 2022). Amici do not repeat the NHRP’s case-specific arguments, but address the broader conceptual framework. Amici submit that the Court of Appeals’ conclusion is philosophically indefensible, legally unsupported, historically inaccurate, and incompatible with the purpose and structure of the Great Writ.

Additional biographical information appears in the Appendix.

**STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED**

**I.**

**DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE DEYOUNG CHIMPANZEES CANNOT BE “PERSONS” FOR PURPOSES OF HABEAS CORPUS?**

Plaintiffs-Appellants answer "YES."

Defendants-Appellees would answer "NO."

Amici Curiae Gary Comstock, Peter Singer, And Adam Lerner answer "YES."

The Court of Appeals answered "NO."

This question was not before the trial court.

## INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court of Appeals denied habeas corpus relief by adopting a narrow “duties and responsibilities” conception of personhood. It reasoned that chimpanzees cannot be persons because they cannot participate in a social-contract exchange of natural liberties for legal obligations. This reasoning misinterprets the social-contract tradition, contradicts centuries of habeas jurisprudence, and produces untenable and discriminatory results.

This Court should reverse. Recognizing habeas standing does not determine the ultimate merits of release; it merely entitles the chimpanzees to a hearing on the legality of their confinement.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Pursuant to MCR 7.312(H)(5), amici curiae Gary Comstock, Peter Singer and Adam Lerner state that this brief was not authored in whole or in part by counsel for a party and no counsel for a party made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief.

## STATEMENT OF FACTS

Amici curiae Gary Comstock, Peter Singer, and Adam Lerner adopt plaintiffs-appellants' statement of facts.

## ARGUMENT I

### THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEYOUNG CHIMPANZEES CANNOT BE “PERSONS” FOR PURPOSES OF HABEAS CORPUS.

#### Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews the district court's denial of habeas relief de novo. *Brown v Romanowski*, 845 F3d 703, 710 (CA6, 2017) citing *Keys v Booker*, 798 F3d 442, 449 (CA6, 2015).

#### (a)

#### **The Court of Appeals mistakenly imported a narrow and historically inaccurate version of social contract theory**

The Court of Appeals held that chimpanzees cannot qualify as “persons” under Michigan’s habeas statute because, in its view, personhood presupposes the capacity to accept legal duties and social responsibilities. Relying on *Nonhuman Rights Project v Breheny*, *supra*, the court adopted the following conception of personhood:

A central aspect of personhood is mankind’s capacity to “give[] up a part of his natural liberty” and oblige[] himself to conform to those laws which the community has thought proper to establish.” (citation omitted)... “Unlike the human species, which has the capacity to accept social responsibilities and legal duties, nonhuman animals cannot—neither individually nor collectively—be held legally accountable or required to fulfill obligations imposed by law.” [*Nonhuman Rights Project*, slip at 13, quoting *Breheny*, *supra*. 38NY3d 572).]

This holding rests on either a misunderstanding of social contract theory or else a novel and implausible extension of it.

The court’s reasoning suggests that a being must first become a legal or moral agent before it can possess any rights. But neither Locke nor Rousseau – nor any classical social contract theorist – ever claimed that basic rights arise from the ability to

bear duties. To the contrary, both held that individuals possess natural rights prior to the formation of civil society and that governments exist to protect those rights. See, e.g. Locke, *Second Treatise of Government: An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government* (Wheeling, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc, 1982.), §§ 4–6. If rights pre-exist civil society, then governments cannot erase someone’s rights on the basis that that person lacks the capacity to bear duties.

One cannot “give up” or “exchange” rights one does not already possess. It follows that, on the contractarian tradition, people need not enter into an agreement and assume social obligations to have rights.

The plain history of the legal evolution of rights confirms the point. Locke expressly affirmed that young children – who plainly lack the capacity to undertake legal obligations – nevertheless possess natural rights that parents and civil authorities are bound to respect. Likewise, Rousseau argued that individuals incapable of participating in collective decision-making retain fundamental interests that the social order must safeguard rather than extinguish. Rousseau, *Du contract social; ou principes du droit politique* (Amsterdam, 1762).

Thus, the grounds on which the Court of Appeals appears to rest its decision are clearly incompatible with its decision. The capacity to undertake legal obligations has never been, and is not now, a prerequisite for having rights. The court’s interpretation reverses the basic logic of the social-contract tradition and is unsupportable philosophically.

(b)

**If social contract theory denies basic legal rights to the DeYoung chimpanzees, it simultaneously denies basic legal rights to many humans.**

The Court of Appeals may have had a different version of social contract theory in mind. In this version, basic moral rights do not depend on the ability to bear duties, but basic legal rights do. In other words, the state only has a legal duty to protect the moral rights of those who can bear duties. This is because only those who can bear duties can enter into the social contract, and the state's legal duty to protect rights arises from the social contract. Echoing this line of thought, the Court of Appeals cites Hobbes: "To make Covenant with bruit Beasts, is impossible; because not understanding our speech, they understand not, . . . and without mutuall acceptation, there is no Covenant." Hobbes, *Leviathan*: Richard Tuck rev'd student ed (Cambridge: University Press, 1996), at 97.

However, this Hobbesian version of social contract theory is demonstratively false. As Hobbes himself realized, this reasoning denies legal rights not only to animals, but to many humans: "Over natural fools, children, or madmen there is no law, no more than over brute beasts; nor are they capable of the title of just or unjust, because they had never power to make any covenant or to understand the consequences thereof" (*Id.*, § II.xxvi.12). While Hobbes believed this posed no problem for his view, it is incompatible with contemporary moral views and Michigan law. And because courts do recognize rights for these humans, Hobbesian personhood cannot be the basis of habeas law.

(c)

**If social contract theory recognizes that all humans have basic legal rights, then it should also recognize that the DeYoung chimpanzees have basic legal rights.**

Nearly all social contract theorists since Hobbes argue that humans must have basic legal rights, even when they lack the capacities required to enter into the social contract. To accommodate this, some social contract theorists limit the theory's ambitions so that it explains only non-basic legal rights. They then combine social contract theory with other theories to explain why humans have basic legal rights. See, e.g, Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).. According to these theorists, nothing within social contract theory itself precludes chimpanzees from having basic legal rights.

Other theorists revise social contract theory so that it can explain why all humans have basic legal duties. However, the theoretical innovations that allow social contract theory to grant rights to all humans – including those who cannot bear duties – also allow it to grant rights to chimpanzees.

***i. Hypothetical contracts can justify rights for humans who cannot contract.***

The main innovation is to conceive of the social contract as a hypothetical contract. A hypothetical contract gives people legal rights not because anyone actually agreed to it, but because certain people *would* have agreed to it under certain conditions. It is irrelevant whether anyone *actually* lacks the capacity to enter a contract or bear duties. The hypothetical contract would still grant them legal rights. All that matters is that they would have negotiated for those rights if they had the capacity to contract; or that

"trustees" (or "representatives") would have negotiated for those rights on their behalf (Freeman, "Contractarian Justice and Severe Cognitive Disabilities" in Cureton & Hill (eds), *Disability in Practice: Attitudes, Policies, and Relationships* (Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2018); or that the parties to the hypothetical contract would have negotiated for those rights under the "veil of ignorance", believing they could be someone without the capacity to contract (Richardson, *Rawlsian Social-Contract Theory and the Severely Disabled*, 10 *J Ethics* 419 (2006); Stark, *How to Include the Severely Disabled in a Contractarian Theory of Justice*, 15 *J Politics & Philosophy* 127 (2007)). However the theory is filled out, the interests of every human – including those who lack the capacity to contract or bear duties – would be represented in negotiations, and the resulting contract would assign them legal rights.

**ii. The same logic extends to chimpanzees.**

Likewise, however the theory is filled out, it can also explain why chimpanzees have legal rights. So long as the contract is hypothetical, it does not matter if actual chimpanzees lack the ability to enter contracts or bear duties. It is enough that they would negotiate for chimpanzee rights if they could enter contracts and bear duties; or that their "trustees" would negotiate for such rights; or that the parties to the social contract would negotiate for such rights because under the "veil of ignorance" they would believe they might end up being chimpanzees. Rowlands, *Contractarianism and Animal Rights*, 14 *J Applied Philosophy* 235 (1997) (arguing that contractors should believe they might be chimpanzees, just as they should believe they might have severe cognitive disabilities, because it is beyond anyone's control whether they are a chimpanzee or have severe cognitive disabilities, and no one deserves to be treated worse for reasons beyond their control). See also, Elliot, *Rawlsian Justice and Non-Human Animals*, 1 *J Applied*

Philosophy 95 (1984); Hilden, *A Contractarian View of Animal Rights: Insuring Against the Possibility of Being a Non-Human Animal*, 14 *Animal L Rev* 5 (2007); VanDeVeer, *Of beasts, persons, and the original position*, 62 *The Monist* 368 (1979)..

In sum, there is nothing within modern social contract theory that prevents the social contract from protecting the interests of chimpanzees.

(d)

**The Court of Appeals' reply is unconvincing.**

Nowhere does the Court of Appeals directly address the most important objection to its reasoning: that if chimpanzees lack legal rights because they cannot bear legal duties, then humans who cannot bear legal duties also lack rights. The closest that the Court of Appeals gets to the issue is to quote *Breheny, supra*: “Unlike the human species, which has the capacity to accept social responsibilities and legal duties, non-human animals cannot—neither individually nor collectively—be held legally accountable or required to fulfill obligations imposed by law.” *Breheny, supra*, 38 NY3d 572. The thought here is that even when humans cannot bear legal duties, they nevertheless have a right to habeas relief because humans can “collectively” bear duties. This line of reasoning originates in a footnote in *People v Lavery*, 124 AD3d 148; 998 NYS2d 248 (2014)::

To be sure, some humans are less able to bear legal duties or responsibilities than others. These differences do not alter our analysis, as it is undeniable that, collectively, human beings possess the unique ability to bear legal responsibility. Accordingly, nothing in this decision should be read as limiting the rights of human beings in the context of habeas corpus proceedings or otherwise. [124 AD3d 150, n 3.]

The problem with the line of reasoning is simple: the second sentence does not follow from the first. From the fact that human beings collectively possess the ability to bear legal responsibility, we are not entitled to conclude that all human beings, whether

or not they can individually bear legal responsibility, are entitled to the rights which, as the judgement has just emphasized, have always been recognized as requiring correlative duties. One might just as well argue: "It is undeniable that Americans, collectively, possess the unique ability to elect the President of the United States. Accordingly, nothing should limit the rights of Americans (including children) to vote."

Such arguments are not valid. We are familiar with many examples of rights without correlative duties, and these examples cannot be explained by an appeal to the collective abilities of humans. Nor can they be explained, as might also be attempted, by claiming that certain abilities are typical or characteristic of the species. Our treatment of others should be dictated by their own characteristics, not the characteristics of their relatives. Hence we cannot base the legal rights that beings have on their ability to understand and carry out their duties. We should, instead, base the legal rights of different beings on their interests.

Imagine a chimpanzee who, through neuroscientific enhancement, has obtained all of the abilities characteristic of human beings. See the case of the "Superchimp" in McMahan, *Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice*, 25 *Philosophy of Public Affairs*, 3 (1996). If individuals had rights only because they are members of a species that typically or characteristically possess such abilities, then we would be forced to withhold rights from this chimpanzee, because chimpanzees do not typically or characteristically possess these abilities. This is absurd. To avoid this implication, one may endorse a disjunctive view, on which individuals have rights either because they have such abilities themselves or because they are members of a species whose members typically or characteristically possess such abilities. This disjunctive view faces several problems. First, it is

theoretically unmotivated. Again, membership in a species whose members typically or characteristically possess such abilities does not by itself allow one to take on legal obligations that, according to the Court of Appeals, grounds one's possession of rights. Second, this disjunctive view implies that human beings who lack these abilities have rights for a fundamentally different reason than other human beings. This offends against ideals of human equality. Third, we have strong reason to be suspicious of any view that makes the possession of rights depend on group membership. Humans have a long history of defending such group-based views (e.g., racism, sexism), and time has invariably proven each and every view to be mistaken.

The DeYoung chimpanzees lack the capacities required to participate in our conversations about promises and obligations. They cannot reciprocate with us or bear legal duties. However, these facts about them no more eliminate them from the circle of persons than does the fact that some humans will never be able to contract, reciprocate, or assume responsibilities. The assertion that individuals must be capable of accepting social duties to be persons is a nonstarter. We reject this way of thinking in unqualified terms and urge an end to this unsound line of reasoning.

(e)

**The proper legal inquiry is whether the DeYoung chimpanzees possess cognitively grounded interests in bodily liberty.**

We have argued that on the best versions of social contract theory, the DeYoung Chimpanzees should have a legal right to habeas relief. But the case for granting habeas relief to chimpanzees does not depend on social contract theory. In lieu of Locke and Blackmore, the case for recognizing the chimpanzee's liberty rights can rely on a third

English theorist who has had an equally large, if not larger, influence on the development of American law, that is, John Stuart Mill. As one authority writes,

It is not an exaggeration to suggest that Mill's influence on American constitutionalism is far broader and deeper than Locke's influence was in the era preceding this. It is perhaps all the more ironic that many contemporary judges are, at best, only vaguely aware of the name, John Stuart Mill, or his influence on our constitutional tradition. [Hill, *The Prophet of Modern Constitutional Liberalism: John Stuart Mill and the Supreme Court* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 58.]

According to Mill, legal rights are grounded in the interests they protect:

To have a right, then, is, I conceive, to have something which society ought to defend me in the possession of. If the objector goes on to ask, why it ought? I can give him no other reason than general utility. [Mill, *Utilitarianism* (London: Parker, Son, and Bourn 1863).]

Mill recognized that animals have strong interests that liberty rights would protect, and so he in turn recognized that animals should have legal protections. "The reasons for legal intervention in favour of children, apply not less strongly to the case of those unfortunate slaves and victims of the most brutal part of mankind, the lower animals." 2 Mill, *Principles of Political Economy: With Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy* (London : John W. Parker, 1848) 525.

Mill's theory of legal rights has several advantages over the view that legal rights depend on the ability to bear legal duties. First, it can explain why humans who cannot bear duties nevertheless have a right to habeas relief: they retain strong interests that this right protects.

Second, it can explain why children do not have weaker rights to habeas relief despite having fewer legal duties to "trade" for those rights: again, they retain strong interests that this right protects.

Third, in contrast to social contract theory, Mill's view can explain why criminals retain legal rights. If, as social contract theory holds, legal rights depended on legal duties, then these rights must depend on the *fulfillment* of these duties. After all, the social contract dictates not only that people bear duties, but that they not violate them. If they violate these duties, they breach the social contract. Because substantial breach of contract releases the other party from its contractual obligations, society would no longer owe legal protection to those whose crimes amount to a substantial breach of the social contract. As Locke himself observes: "if he disclaim the lawful Government of the Country he was born in, he must also quit the Right that belong'd to him by the Laws of it . . ."

Locke, *supra*, § 191.

But this is false. Even those who commit the most heinous crimes retain at least some legal rights – e.g., to be spared cruel and unusual punishment, a right codified in US Const Amend VIII, but present in the common law tradition. The view that rights depend on duties cannot explain this, but Mill's view of rights can: e.g., they retain the right to be spared cruel and unusual punishment because they retain a strong interest in avoiding cruel and unusual punishment.

To be clear, we agree that people with legal rights typically have legal duties. Even Mill agrees:

Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society owes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders it indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of conduct towards the rest. [Mill, *On Liberty* Mill, *On Liberty 2nd ed.* London: John W. Parker & Sons, 1859), §4, p 134; (Savill and Edwards ed., 2nd ed. 1859), <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011538483>;

But it is one thing to think that those who have legal rights also have legal duties, and quite another to claim that those who have legal rights have legal rights *because* and *only if* they have legal duties. After all, Mill himself believes that children and animals should have legal protection even though they cannot bear legal duties. The more plausible connection between duties and rights is that everyone with strong interests deserves legal protections, and in return they must bear legal duties *insofar as their capacities allow*. This is why children's legal duties (and legal culpability) increase as they mature, but their basic legal protections remain constantly strong.

On John Stuart Mill's approach to rights, the relevant question is not whether the DeYoung chimpanzees can bear legal duties; it is whether they possess interests in bodily liberty that a right to habeas relief would protect, and whether there is any social cost to giving them this right.

As discussed in detail in plaintiffs-appellants' application for leave to appeal, scientific consensus establishes that chimpanzees exhibit:

- self-recognition
- long-term memory and future planning
- complex emotional states (including grief and empathy)
- sophisticated problem-solving and communication abilities
- rich social relationships

These are, in fact, the cognitive capacities that ground the morally and legally cognizable liberty interest that habeas relief protects.


Amici are aware of no compelling evidence that recognizing habeas standing would impose unavoidable social costs. If habeas protects interests in bodily liberty, and chimpanzees have such interests, then they fall within habeas's protective scope.

For that reason, we urge the court to recognize that the DeYoung chimpanzees have a legal right to a hearing in order to determine whether their confinement is unlawful.

### CONCLUSION

The Court of Appeals' decision rests on a restrictive and legally unsupported conception of personhood that conflicts with Michigan law, the Anglo-American habeas tradition, and scientific understanding of chimpanzee cognition. The DeYoung chimpanzees possess compelling, scientifically established interests in bodily liberty. The Great Writ exists to protect those interests.

This Court should grant the Nonhuman Rights Project's application for leave to appeal and hold that the chimpanzees confined at the DeYoung Family Zoo are "persons" entitled to seek habeas corpus relief under Michigan law.

  
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### CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH WORD LIMITATION

In compliance with MCR 7.212(B)(5), counsel for Amicus Curiae certifies that this brief contains no more than 4,014 words.

**STATE OF MICHIGAN  
IN THE SUPREME COURT**

NONHUMAN RIGHTS  
PROJECT, INC., on behalf of  
Prisoner A (aka Louie),  
Prisoner B, Prisoner C,  
Prisoner D, Prisoner E,  
Prisoner F, and Prisoner G  
("DeYoung Prisoners"),

Petitioners-Appellants,  
vs.  
DEYOUNG FAMILY ZOO, LLC  
and HAROLD L. DEYOUNG,

Defendants-Appellees.  
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Docket No. 169351  
Docket no. 369247  
Menominee Circuit Court  
LC Case No. No. 23-17621-AH  
Hon. Mary B. Barglind

**APPENDIX TO  
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE  
ON BEHALF OF  
GARY COMSTOCK, PETER SINGER,  
AND ADAM LERNER**

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**Gary Comstock** is Alumni Distinguished Undergraduate Professor of Philosophy at North Carolina State University. He conducts research on ethical questions in the biological sciences. He is especially interested in animal minds and the moral relevance of what's known and not known about the brains and behaviors of nonhuman mammals. In his book, *Research Ethics: A Philosophical Guide to the Responsible Conduct of Research* (Cambridge, 2013), Comstock shows how Peter Singer's expanding circle metaphor lends coherence to an otherwise disparate set of issues in research ethics.

An award-winning researcher and teacher, Comstock's *New York Times* essay, "You Should Not Have Let Your Baby Die," received Honorable Mention in the PEA Soup 2017 Ethics Prize competition. Two years earlier, he was named an NC State Alumni Association Outstanding Teacher of the Year. A coauthor of *Chimpanzee Rights: The Philosophers' Brief*, and co-editor of *The Moral Rights of Animals*, Comstock wrote *Vexing Nature? On the Ethical Case Against Agricultural Biotechnology*.

For two years, Comstock was ASC Fellow of the National Humanities Center. He continued there as Editor-in-Chief of *On the Human*, one of the Center's online projects. Comstock directed the Open Seminar in Research Ethics, and is editor of two more books, *Life Science Ethics*, and *Is There a Moral Obligation to Save the Family Farm?* He served on the committee that co-authored the third edition of *On Being a Scientist*.

**Peter Singer** is the Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics, Emeritus, at Princeton University. Journalists have called him the "world's most influential living philosopher." His most influential work has focused on the ethics of our treatment of animals, which is often credited with starting the modern animal rights movement, and on obligations to alleviate extreme poverty, which inspired and continues to influence the movement of

effective altruism. Key figures concerned with animal welfare, including Jane Goodall and Ingrid Newkirk have said that his book, *Animal Liberation* (1<sup>st</sup> ed. 1975, updated as *Animal Liberation Now*, HarperCollins, 2023), led them to get involved in the struggle to reduce the vast amount of suffering we inflict on animals. To that end, he co-founded the Australian Federation of Animal Societies, now Animals Australia, the country's largest and most effective animal advocacy organization. In 2021 he was awarded the Berggruen Prize for Philosophy and Culture, a \$1 million award given annually to "thinkers whose ideas have profoundly shaped human self-understanding and advancement in a rapidly changing world."

Singer is the founder of The Life You Can Save, an organization based on his book of the same name. It aims to spread his ideas about why people in developed countries should be doing much more to improve the lives of people living in extreme poverty, and how we can best do this.

Singer's writings on poverty include: the 1972 essay "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" in which he argues for donating to help the global poor; and two books that make the case for effective giving: *The Life You Can Save* (Random House, 2009) and *The Most Good You Can Do* (Yale, 2015).

Singer has written, co-authored, edited or co-edited more than 50 books, including *Practical Ethics*, *The Expanding Circle*, *Rethinking Life and Death*, *One World*, *The Ethics of What We Eat* (with Jim Mason) and *The Point of View of the Universe* (with Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek). His writings have appeared in more than 30 languages.

Singer was educated at the University of Melbourne and the University of Oxford. After teaching in England, the United States, and Australia, in 1999 he became

Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics in the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University, a position he held for 25 years.

**Adam Lerner** holds a PhD in philosophy from Princeton University, where he earned the Porter Ogden Jacobus Fellowship, Princeton's top honor for graduate students. Currently, he is a student at Yale Law School. Previously, he was a Post-Doctoral Associate in the Center for Population-Level Bioethics at Rutgers University, Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University, and Assistant Professor/Faculty Fellow in the Center for Bioethics at New York University.

Lerner's work lies at the intersection of ethics, metaethics, and moral psychology. In his dissertation, he argued that appreciating the role of empathy in moral inquiry can help us make progress on debates about the strength of our obligations to reduce animal suffering and extreme poverty. He also works on questions in political philosophy, population ethics, and moral epistemology. His work has appeared in venues such as *The Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, *Philosophical Studies*, and *Philosophical Perspectives*.